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Abstract 
 
 
The goal of this paper is twofold. First, we put together, for the first time, quantitative measures 
on the quality of the corporate governance and the ownership structure for 65 non-financial 
listed companies in Argentina with information for 2003-2004. A wide array of official and 
private sources were used to this purpose. In a nutshell, companies seem to be poorly governed 
vis-à-vis international practices. In turn, ownership appears to be quite concentrated at the level 
of the largest ultimate shareholder, but separation of control and cash flow rights prevails in less 
than half of the companies, with pyramiding being the main mechanism to create such wedge. 
Second, we put to the test the predictions of recent theories linking those measures with 
corporate performance and dividend policy in 2000-2003. Concerning performance, the results 
point to a sizable and robust effect of our governance measure on both the return on assets and 
Tobin’s q. Moreover, the separation of control and cash flow rights for the largest shareholder –
an indicator of the incentives to expropriate minority shareholders- hinders performance 
directly, and also attenuates the beneficial impact from good governance rules. When it comes 
to dividends, only our governance measure appears to exert a positive and marked effect on the 
cash dividend-to-cash flow ratio. However, the estimates prove to be fragile to the inclusion of 
some additional controls correlated to governance.  
 
 
 
(*) This study is being financed by the IADB and was selected from an open Latin American competition 
launched under the IADB Research Network. We are very grateful for comments from Alberto Chong, 
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Enrique Kawamura, and seminar participants at the IADB Research Network 
meetings, the Center for Financial Stability in Buenos Aires, and the universities of La Plata and San 
Andres, Argentina. The superb research assistantship of Horacio Pozzo and Máximo Sangiácomo is 
gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies.  
Introduction 
 
 
Since the 1970s a growing literature has developed linking corporate policies and 
performance with governance and ownership structures. While profusely studied within 
academic circles, these models did not gain a more widespread popularity until very 
recently. Corporate scandals around the world in the last years contributed to raise 
awareness among managers, investors and regulators, and an effort is under way in 
many countries to produce quantitative measures on ownership and governance, and to 
estimate their impact on the value and decision making process of firms.     
 
The present study builds on this line of research by providing empirical evidence for 
Argentina on the role of governance and ownership on corporate performance and 
dividend policies in 1996-2003, with particular emphasis in the last years (2000-2003). 
Guided by this goal, we have assembled a unique set of corporate governance and 
ownership indicators for the available sample of 65 non-financial listed firms. The 
Argentine stock market is poorly developed, and so are the standards and practices of 
corporate governance, so it is of interest to assess whether the agency and information 
problems usually studied and found in more active markets have also a bearing on the 
functioning of a much thinner one. Equally relevant is to stress the focus of this work 
around the recent financial crisis in 2001-2002. In the midst of a deep financial crisis, 
financial distress and uncertainty are exacerbated, making the emergence of conflicts of 
interests and opportunistic incentives much more likely to arise. Henceforth, financial 
crises are a particularly appealing study case to assess the disciplining role of corporate 
governance on company´s insiders. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 1, we present our working hypotheses. In 
Section 2, we portray the situation of corporate governance and ownership structure in 
Argentina as of 2003-2004, relying on a set of measures specifically built for this study. 
In Section 3, we investigate the empirical link between such measures and corporate 
performance, with Section 4 devoted to the link with dividend policies. Some 
concluding remarks close.  
 
 
1. Literature review and working hypotheses 
 
1.1 Corporate governance, ownership and performance  
 
A great deal of attention has been given to understanding how corporate governance and 
ownership structures affect firm’s performance. Corporate governance can influence a 
firm’s performance whenever a conflict of interest arises between management and 
shareholders and/or between controlling and minority shareholders. In the management-
shareholders conflict, the agency problem manifests itself in management´s low effort 
and unproductive investments, usually known as perquisites. In the controlling-minority 
shareholders conflict, the controlling ones use their power to benefit themselves at the 
expense of the minority shareholders, in what is called expropriation or private benefits 
of control. The root of both conflicts is the fact that the manager in the first case, and 
the controlling shareholders in the second one, receive only a portion of the firm`s net 
revenue, while they fully appropriate the resources diverted. Thus, it is conceivable that, 
in light of this incentive structure, insiders will maximize their (pecuniary and non-
pecuniary) utility even when the firm as a whole will not.  
 
Of course, the ability to fulfill these goals is conditioned to the power insiders have in 
the company´s decision process. Managers will enjoy more power as they are part or act 
in connivance with the board and the controlling shareholders. In turn, the power of 
controlling shareholders relies in how effectively they can manipulate board decisions 
by the way of voting majorities and other means – distortionary policies will then be 
heightened as the ratio between voting to cash flow rights is higher (see La Porta et al. 
(1999) and Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang (1999)). Outsiders have two main 
instruments to counterbalance this power: the enforcement of adequate corporate 
governance standards and the quality of the regulatory and legal environment, which 
should discourage detrimental actions by insiders and, once committed, allow affected 
stakeholders to challenge them through corporate and judicial channels. 
 
While a wedge between control and cash flow rights are likely to harm minority 
shareholders and corporate valuation,  Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Morck, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1988) make the point that concentrated ownership may actually have an 
ambiguous effect: on one hand, there may be a beneficial effect on performance and 
valuation (the so-called “incentive effect”) in that higher cash flows rights in the hands 
of a few shareholders tends to reduce the free riding problem associated to dispersed 
ownership when it comes to monitor and punish opportunistic managers; on the other 
hand, the negative effect (the “entrenchment effect”) above mentioned may take place 
whenever there is high concentration of control rights and/or separation between control 
and cash flow rights. 
 
International evidence has flourished in the last few years. Claessens et al. (op.cit.), 
Klapper and Love (2002) and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2002) 
are prominent efforts in proving the nexus between corporate governance and 
performance using cross-country data, while other studies look at individual countries, 
like the U.S. (see Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003)), Korea (see Black, Jang and Kim  
(2003)) and Germany (see Drobetz, Schillhoffer and Zimmermann (2003)). By aiming 
to analyze the relationship between corporate governance and ownership structure with 
performance (as measured by the return on assets and the Tobin’s q) in Argentina in 
2000-2003, the present work forms part of the latter country-level line of research. 
 
1.2 Corporate governance, ownership and dividend policies  
 
The reasons why firms pay dividends or not has being under a heated debate for the last 
five decades since the seminal paper by Lintner (1956). This and many subsequent 
pieces of research convincingly established that firms aim to avoid drastic changes in 
dividends over time. However, early dividend theories did not warrant such preference 
for smoothing cash distributions. As a matter of fact, Miller and Modigliani (1961) 
advanced the idea that, when financial markets are frictionless, investors are indifferent 
between dividends and capital gains as far as they can substitute one for the other in 
order to reach their desired level of cash dividends by selling or buying stock. The 
usually observed differences in tax rates between dividends and capital gains rose as the 
first argument against this dividend irrelevance proposition. It was at this time that 
Black (1976) coined the label “dividend puzzle” to illustrate the astonishing contrast 
between a theoretical body claiming either the irrelevance or the disadvantage of paying 
dividends and the indisputable fact that firms pay relatively high and stable dividends.  
 
Since the early 1980s, a host of papers offer alternative and appealing approaches to 
disentangle this enigma, most of them rooted in information asymmetries between firm 
insiders and outsiders and bounded rationality of the latter (see Baker et al. (2003) for a 
survey and Bebczuk (2003) for a textbook presentation). One of such recent hypotheses 
is that firms pay dividends to credibly signal their quality to the market in order to 
mitigate the undervaluation that arises in an adverse selection context. By paying high 
and stable dividends, high-quality companies might distinguish themselves from low-
quality competitors for funds (see for example Miller and Rock (1985)), which may be 
unable to mimic the first group –unlike poor-performance companies, profitable firms 
can replace the diminished retained earnings with the more expensive external funds. 
Another strand of literature focuses on the agency problems between managers and 
shareholders, making the point that higher dividends partially prevent managers from 
committing moral hazard at the expense of shareholders, by reducing the free cash flow 
at the disposal of those running the firm (see Jensen (1986)). Finally, other scholars 
have put forward behavioral explanations that support the investor preference for cash 
dividends, such as the psychological (but not necessarily rational from a purely financial 
standpoint) loss derived from the principal reduction of selling stock or the regret of 
liquidating stock just before its price rises.  
 
The main insight of the asymmetric information theories is that insiders may be 
reluctant to pay dividends to outsiders. The underlying argument is as follows: for a 
given amount of cash flows generated by the firm, the controlling shareholders and 
managers must choose between fully appropriating those funds for themselves –the 
above mentioned private benefits of control- or distributing them equally among the 
universe of shareholders according to their cash flow rights. Consequently, the testable 
prediction of this theoretical body are that dividend disbursements will be higher: (i) the 
better the corporate governance standards are (that is, the better the protection to 
minority shareholders), (ii) the higher the concentration of cash flow rights, (iii) the 
lower the control rights, and (iv) the lower the separation between control and cash flow 
rights. 
 
At this point, it is imperative to establish the explanatory power of this theoretical 
framework for financially developed as opposed to emerging markets. The model 
implicit in the theories just described is one where: (a) Ownership is highly dispersed, 
and dividend recipients are different from the company’s decision-makers. In this 
context, dividend policy is mostly driven by market value considerations, in which 
dividends are a device to mitigate potential conflicts of interest between insiders and 
outsiders. The ultimate goal of the dividend policy is to maximize the stock price so as 
to reduce the cost of equity in future stock issues; (b) Capital markets are efficient, in 
that stock prices fully capture any value-related corporate change; and (c) Firms do not 
appear to face important financial constraints in the present, as they enjoy some freedom 
to determine how much to distribute from their net earnings, filling the gap with other 
sources of funding, such as external equity or debt.  
 
Nevertheless, one must realize that some of these assumptions behind these theories 
(particularly, the signalling approach) may not be entirely realistic for an emerging 
market like Argentina that exhibit: (i) high ownership concentration (leading minority 
shareholders not to be a primary concern for the company’s officers); (ii) negligible 
primary or issuance stock market (defusing the main incentive  mechanism for 
improving governance, namely, the ability to issue more valuable stock in the future); 
(iii) a questionable degree of market efficiency (even though the evidence is mixed (see 
Fernandez (2002) and Bebczuk (1997)), causing dividend announcements potentially 
not to be clearly reflected in stock prices; and (iv)  current financial constraints at the 
firm level (see Bebczuk, Fanelli and Pradelli (2002)), owing to which meeting the cash 
dividend demand from outside shareholders may mean that good investment 
opportunities have to be passed up in response to the funding shortage. In other words, 
retained earnings may have no close (not even more onerous) substitutes at all.  
 
For these reasons, at the time of searching for the determinants of dividend payments, 
we will bear in mind that, besides governance and ownership considerations, dividend, 
financing and investment policies are likely to be intertwined, regardless of whether the 
companies are governed by an owner-manager or display dispersed ownership with 
separation of management and property.  
 
 
 
 
2. Corporate Governance and Ownership Structure in Argentina 
 
This section describes the current status of corporate governance and ownership 
structure in Argentina to motivate the subsequent analytical work. Even though we are 
initially reporting information on the total 103 listed companies as of November 2003, 
the usable sample for econometric purposes was substantially reduced because: (i) We 
excluded listed financial institutions -because of the specificity of their line of business 
and their heavy regulation- and firms in general without complete information. This 
leaves 65 firms; and (ii) We were able to gather complete ownership information was 
assembled for only 54 firms out of these 65 companies. 
 
As a preliminary remark, it must be said that the Argentina stock market is quite 
undeveloped, as shown in the following table: 
 
Table 1 
 
Capital market indicators in Argentina and selected regions
Average 1997-2001, in percentage of GDP, unless stated otherwise
Argentina Developed Latin America Other developing
countries (excl. Argentina) countries
Domestic 
equity issues 0.23 3.60 1.10 2.35
Foreign 
equity issues 0.32 1.30 0.23 0.49
Number of listed
companies (2000) 129 1093 409 410
Change in number of listed
companies (in %, 1990-2000) -30.2 37.0 -3.2 117.5
Value 
traded 4.7 61.4 10.5 40.6
Market
capitalization 30.8 90.7 43.6 48.0
Source: Own calculations based on data from the International Federation of Stock Exchanges.  
 
 
As apparent from the table, Argentina ranks lowest compared to other regions in terms 
of key variables such as domestic equity issues, value traded, market capitalization, 
number of listed companies and fraction of delistings. 
 
Historically, listed firms have displayed very poor standards of corporate governance in 
Argentina. Nevertheless, a host of changes took place since the nineties that affected 
corporate governance standards in a priori positive fashion: the renewed access to 
foreign capital flows, a moderate growth of domestic capital markets, the privatization 
of public utilities, the emergence of the institutional investors industry (led by private 
pension funds), the growing importance of foreign capital in the financial and 
nonfinancial sector, and the foreign listing of some domestic companies. These features 
induced the Government to issue the so-called Transparency Decree (Decreto de 
Transparencia, No. 677/2001), where a number of governance guidelines inspired by 
international best practices and standards were established for listed companies. 
However, modest progress has been actually achieved so far in spite of the well-
intended goals of the reform. It is worth noting that the virtual inactivity of the primary 
stock markets, both before and after the 2001-2002 crisis, creates no incentives for firms 
to upgrade their governance practices.  
 
To dispose of a quantitative and mostly objective measure of corporate governance, we 
are constructing, for the first time, a Corporate Governance Index for listed companies 
in Argentina. The work closely relates  to others in this direction (see OECD (1999), 
Fremond and Capaul (2002), COSRA (2000), Klapper and Love (2002), Standard and 
Poor´s (2002), Gompers et al. (op.cit.), Black et al.(op.cit.), Drobetz et al. (op.cit.)). The 
CGI was designed to encompass two complementary measures: (a) A Transparency and 
Disclosure Index (TDI) based on public information on each company, reflecting their 
norms of transparency and disclosure, which are a crucial element of corporate 
governance. This information comes from a number of public information sources 
(balance sheets, annual reports, filings with domestic and foreign regulatory agencies, 
security issuance prospects, company’s internet websites, and the like); (b) A complete 
Corporate Governance Index (CGI) based on a questionnaire sent out to each company 
to be answered either electronically or personally. The TDI was designed and completed 
between August and November 2003, while progress on the CGI has been hindered due 
to the extremely low rate of response on the part of surveyed firms and thus will not be 
used in what follows.1 We are confident that the TDI is a comprehensive measure of 
corporate governance that will be highly correlated with the whole CGI, as happened in 
other cases (see for example Black et al. (2003)), and we will be using it as our measure 
of corporate governance hereafter. Furthermore, the TDI has three distinctive 
advantages in that: (i) it is clearly objective and documented, (ii) in a country like 
Argentina where disclosure requirements are low and mostly limited to accounting 
information, it reflects  voluntary rather than mandatory information, and thus it may 
display a desirable variability across firms, and (iii) it is not affected by the frequent low 
response rate in company surveys, which with a small universe of listed nonfinancial 
firms in Argentina can be a unsolvable obstacle to perform econometric analysis as a 
result of the very small final sample. Conversely, it has the limitation that it does not 
allow to know about corporate governance features that the company has decided not to 
disclose openly. 
 
Next we discuss the most salient features and results from the TDI based on our usable 
sample of 65 listed firms. The TDI tries to assess how transparent corporate information 
is and how protected against expropriation outside investors are, thus providing a 
measure about the balance of power between insiders and outsiders. The items cover a 
broad range of governance topics, including the functioning of the executive organs, the 
communication with outside stakeholders, and the flow of information required for a 
proper monitoring of the firm by minority shareholders. The TDI comprises a total of 32 
binary items, for each of them, the company is given a value of 1 if there is partial or 
total public information, and a value of 0 otherwise. We further divide the Index into 
three subindices: Board, Disclosure, and Shareholders. The subindex Board measure 
the structure, procedures and compensation of Board and Top Management members. 
The subindex Disclosure measures the degree to which the company informs relevant 
corporate facts to outside stakeholders. Finally, the subindex Shareholders measures the 
quality of information regarding the compensation to minority shareholders. The 
                                                 
1 Questionnaires were sent out in early March 2004, and after many reminders, only 9 responses were obtained as of November 
2004. 
structure of the TDI, and the percentage of positive entries on each item, are presented 
in Table 2. 
 
Following the methodology outlined in the seminal paper by La Porta et al. (op.cit.), we 
have also investigated the ownership structure of listed Argentine firms. The task 
proved to be quite challenging as a result of data limitations. Companies are not legally 
required to disclose their ownership structures.2 Accordingly, we needed to rely on an 
array of dispersed resources, such as annual reports, issuance prospects, filings with 
local and foreign regulators, the company´s and other websites, and newspapers and 
business magazines. The field work was developed between September 2003 and May 
2004. 
 
La Porta et al. (op.cit.), Claessens et al.(op.cit) and subsequent related research look for 
the ultimate owners of each firm in order to establish the degree of ownership 
concentration and the difference between cash flow and voting rights –this difference 
being explained by the use of pyramiding, deviations from the one share-one vote rule, 
and cross-holdings. After going through the different chains of ownership, four main 
types of ultimate owners will come up: families, the government, and widely held 
financial or nonfinancial corporations.  
 
In the case of Argentina, as state enterprises have been privatized and there are no 
domestic widely held companies, we distinguish two types of ultimate ownership, 
namely, national families and foreign firms. For each firm, starting from their direct 
shareholders, we trace back the shareholders of these shareholders until finding an 
Argentine family or individual, or a foreign firm. In the latter case, we did not identify 
the ultimate owners because it was not especially relevant for the present work.  
 
We have defined the following variables: (a) Cash flow rights of the main ultimate 
shareholder; (b) Control rights of the main ultimate shareholder on the company; (c) 
Voting-to-Cash Flow rights of the main ultimate shareholder; (d) No one share-one vote 
rule; (e) Pyramiding; (f) Cross-holdings; (g) Domestically-owned company; and (h) 
Widely held company. For the precise definitions of these variables, as well as of the 
other variables used along the present work, the reader is referred to Table 3. 
 
Summary statistics on the TDI and ownership variables appear in Table 4. Out of 100, 
the average TDI is just 39.1, with a minimum of 18.8 and a maximum of 84.4, revealing 
a low average quality of corporate governance. The three subindices are equally low on 
average, with Disclosure showing the highest level (49.4 out of 100) and Board the 
lowest (28.4 out of 100). Concerning ownership, it is evident that property is quite 
concentrated, with the largest ultimate shareholder owing, on average, the 63.1% of 
votes and 56.9% of cash flows. Ownership structures are relatively simple, and  
deviations of control and cash flow rights of 2 percentage points or more occur in just 
22 out of the 54 companies under study. For these 22 firms, the control-to-cash flow 
ratio is 1.74 (1.30 for the 54 firms). It is known that this wedge can be attained through 
deviations from the one share-one vote rule, pyramiding and cross-holdings. In the 
Argentine case, pyramiding has been found in 20 company and dual class shares in 6 
companies, with no cross-holdings detected in the sample. Argentine families and 
individuals are the largest ultimate owners in 25 firms (46% of the sample), and foreign 
                                                 
2 The only exception is that they must inform about changes involving more that 5% of capital, but even in these cases they are not 
obligated to present information on owners that not participate in such particular transaction.  
firms are the largest ultimate owners in the remaining 29 firms (54%). No widely held 
companies exist in Argentina. 
 
Table 5 contains the frequency of some of the measures just discussed. The TDI 
distribution is heavily skewed to the left, with a thick tail, as 60% of the sample is 
below a ranking of 37.5. The opposite applies to the distributions of control and cash 
flow rights, where only the first decile is below 30%. Likewise, the control-to-cash flow 
ratio is above unity in only the last three deciles. The pairwise correlation among 
governance and ownership indicators can be seen in Table 6. The TDI is strongly 
correlated with each of the subindices, and have a weak and negative association with 
the control and cash flow rights variables (which, owing to the lack of separation 
between them, do have a high correlation to each other). The TDI and the control-to-
cash flow ratio show a positive and significant, but rather low, correlation.  
 
 
Section 3: Determinants of corporate performance 
 
 
We now turn to the determinants of corporate performance. The period of analysis is 
2000-2003.3 As the severe, full-blown financial crisis unraveled at the beginning of 
2002 may have affected the behavior and performance of firms, the sample was broken 
down to run separate cross-section regressions for the whole period, and for the 2000-
2001 and 2002-2003 subperiods.  
 
We follow previous studies by taking the return on assets (henceforth, ROA) and 
Tobin’s q as indicators of performance. The return on assets is an accounting measure 
of profitability and efficiency, while Tobin’s q captures market expectations about 
future earnings. Even though one would expect some correlation between them, this 
may not be always the case –as a matter of fact, the simple correlation in our sample is 
positive but not significant. Furthermore, the implications are radically different in each 
case:  while the ROA-corporate governance link reflects a tangible, balance-sheet effect, 
the q-corporate governance nexus has more to do with market perceptions about the 
value of corporate governance. In light of the absence of a primary capital market in 
Argentina, firms are to a great extent unable to capitalize their governance quality, but 
may be encourage to upgrade it as long as a direct effect on accounting profitability 
exists. In line with the arguments offered in Section 1, the key explanatory variables are 
the TDI (with a positive expected sign), the cash flow rights (positive), the control 
rights of the largest shareholder (negative), and the control-to-cash flow ratio (negative). 
 
We include a set of controls in the regressions. We expect firm age to have a negative 
effect on performance as long as older firms may poorly managed under archaic rules 
dictated by members of the founding family. Firm size may have a negative effect if 
size is correlated with the exhaustion of growth opportunities, but may contrarily have a 
positive impact whenever size is correlated with more diversification, more economies 
of scale and scope, more professionalized management, and less severe financial 
constraints. The leverage ratio (debt to assets) can, on one hand, improve performance 
by limiting managerial misbehavior and by serving as a signal of high quality, but, on 
the other hand, a high leverage may lead to asset substitution and underinvestment (see 
                                                 
3 The decision not to go back in time comes from the fact that our governance and ownership indicators reflect the situation as of 
2003-2004. Even though these variables change slowly over time (and thus we are assuming that they are valid for the whole period 
2000-2003), we cannot be certain that they are an adequate representation for the 1990s. 
Weill (2003) and Bebczuk (2003, op. cit)). Sales growth is a proxy for the product 
demand faced by the firm and its productivity. We also postulate that ADR issuers may 
have comparatively better performance driven by the need to compete for funds with 
foreign firms. Additionally, firms are classified into four broad sectors (industry, 
utilities, other services, and primary products) that vary in productive technology and 
international tradeability. We use lagged values from the two years previous to the 
sample period of the debt ratio and the sales growth rate as regressors. 
 
Tables 7 and 8 present summary statistics for the additional controls and their simple 
correlations with ROA, q, and the governance and ownership variables. On a visual 
inspection, the correlation between ROA and TDI (0.31) is the only significant one. 
Also worth mentioning is the high correlation between ln(Assets) and TDI -0.62-. Since 
this gives rise to multicolinearity, preventing us from correctly estimating the 
independent contribution of each of them, in the reported regressions we have replaced 
ln(Assets) for a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company is in the highest 
20% in terms of average total assets in 2000-2001, and 0 otherwise.  
 
3.1 Baseline results 
 
Tables 9 and 10 show the regression of ROA and q, respectively, against the TDI 
without adding additional controls, while in Tables 11 and 12 appear the regressions 
with such controls (except the ownership variables, which are included later on). The 
overall assessment is that the TDI has a positive and highly significant effect on both 
ROA and q –besides, the estimated coefficients remain reasonably stable across 
specifications and time periods. The quantitative effect is also remarkable: looking at 
the estimates for the entire 2000-2003 period with controls, for a firm with the average 
TDI (39.13), an increase of 10 points in its TDI to 49.13 would translate into a jump of 
2.62 percentage points in its ROA, that is, an increase of 1.9 percentage point from the 
2000-2003 average ROA (0.73%). Assuming a worst-to-best improvement in TDI 
(18.75 to 84.38), the ROA increase would amount to 3.58 percentage points. Repeating 
the exercise for q (whose 2000-2003 average is 0.89), the magnitudes are much more 
modest but still noticeable: a 10-point improvement in TDI would induce q to go up by 
0.059 and a worst-to-best improvement by 0.38. For both ROA and q, the TDI estimates 
are statistically more significant in the 2000-2001 than in the 2002-2003 subperiod, 
although the coefficient do not change much. In principle, the lost explanatory power 
might be blamed on the noise brought about by the financial crisis in the latter 
subperiod.  
 
No control variable reaches acceptable levels of significance in the ROA equations. In 
the q equations, conversely, the size dummy enters positively at 5% and the leverage 
ratio at 10%. For 2002-2003, the industry and primary product dummies also become 
significant, which may be explained by the boost in profitability linked to the steep peso 
devaluation –meanwhile sales growth enters with a difficult to rationalize negative sign. 
 
3.2 Robustness checks 
 
In what follows we carry out a battery of robustness checks to test the validity of the 
previous empirical findings. We start by running individual regressions, keeping the 
same control set as before, of each of the subindices and other alternative governance 
measures. As apparent from Table 13, Board and Disclosure, but not Shareholders, have 
a positive and significant loading in the ROA equation for the whole 2000-2003. The 
coefficient on Disclosure is the highest (0.00056) and is similar to that of the overall 
TDI –the ones on Board and Shareholders are 0.00038 and 0.00014, respectively. 
Again, results seem to be much stronger in 2000-2001 than in 2002-2003, and, as a 
matter of fact, all coefficients are significant in the former two-year period but not in the 
latter. Since it is to be expected that most governance provisions are interrelated and 
have some degree of commonality, we also use the first principal component of the 
three subindices to minimize such overlapping. In this case, as when we take the median 
TDI, the estimates stay significant. The q regressions from Table 14 reveal that Board is 
the highest and most significant subindex and that the median TDI is the only one 
lacking significance across all time periods. 
 
We can ask ourselves whether the TDI is the only proper measure of corporate 
governance. In spite of being an objective and documented index, there might be a 
caveat against our TDI in that it does not directly reflect the actual governance practices 
but how much about them the company decides to disclose openly. In order to 
circumvent this possible criticism, we come up with a couple of alternative measures. In 
the first place, we made an attempt with a detailed survey sent out to all listed firms, 
which unfortunately was completed by just 10 companies –we go back to this later on in 
the paper. Afterwards, we intended to fill this informational void by running a short 3-
question phone company survey, with similar poor results.4 Subsequently, we proceeded 
to go over the charters of all the companies in the sample in search of distinctive 
features regarding corporate governance that are not legally binding (and hence can 
display the desirable cross-section variability), such as the self-imposition of the one 
share-one vote rule and of minimum (i) dividends, (ii) percentage of independent 
directors, or (iii) percentage of votes to call a Extraordinary Shareholders Meeting (in 
the latter case, below the legal 5%). Once again, this effort turned out to be fruitless, as 
virtually all companies have very standardized Charters that merely stick to the legal 
framework. 5  
 
Ultimately, we constructed a compact Corporate Governance Index including three 
binary (0-1) variables, namely, whether the firm: (a) has a positive weight the stock 
portfolio of any Argentine pension fund (40% of the companies); (b) accepted to 
complete our governance survey (15% of the companies); and (c) has a percentage of 
independent directors above the mean for our sample (22%, and 37% of the companies). 
Even though this index is restricted to few variables, it has a valuable informational 
content regarding governance, as Item (a) is a nice proxy for market perception on 
corporate governance by professional fund managers, Item (b) gives a notion of the 
willingness to disclose corporate information (and, due to some degree of self-selection, 
would most likely be correlated with good governance), and Item (c) offers most 
relevant information about governance practices not included in our TDI.6 Table 15 
presents the results, where it is apparent that this new index is highly significant in the 
                                                 
4 As a matter of fact, the Investor Relations Officer (Responsable de Relaciones con el Mercado) of only three companies responded 
to our phone calls after two reminders over a two-week period. To facilitate participation, the survey was narrowed down to just 3 
questions: (a) Has the company issued or subscribed to a Code of Best Practices on Corporate Governance?; (b) Does the External 
Auditor provide any additional paid-for service to the company?; and (c) Does the company inform its controlling and minority 
shareholders about the rationale and amount of the remuneration to the top management and the Board, discriminating the fixed and 
variable components and the form of payment (cash, shares, options)?  
5 With the exception of the one share-one vote rule, which is voluntarily included by 66% of the companies in their Charters, the 
remaining items are present in at most  3 out of the 65 companies. 
6 The new index ranges from 0 to 3, and its mean value is 0.93, with a correlation of 0.4 with the TDI. We also tried other 
components for the index, including the one share-one vote dummy, whether the CEO and the Chairman of the Board are the same 
person, and whether the CEO and/or any director are at the same time direct controlling shareholders of the company. However, the 
results lose statistical significance when any of these variables were added to the index. Given that these variables are usually 
associated with good governance, these results call for additional work about what role these variables actually play on corporate 
governance and performance. 
ROA regressions for 2000-2003 and 2000-2001 and in the q regression for 2002-2003. 
Since the three components may be correlated to each other, and the new index may be 
in turn correlated with the TDI, we additionally computed the principal component with 
and without the TDI. From the same table, we witness a greater significance in both 
ROA and q regressions, especially when the TDI is included. This implies that the new 
index seems to complement rather than to substitute the TDI as a measure of corporate 
governance.  
 
To have another robustness proof, we sent out a questionnaire to pension funds 
operating in Argentina to inquire about their perception of corporate governance 
practices in the companies they usually trade. We included only 4 general questions, 
giving for each of them 5 choices, from “Very Good” to “Very Bad”.7 8 out of the 10 
pension funds returned the questionnaire filled out. Even with a much smaller sample 
(26 companies), the baseline regressions keep yielding highly significant estimates on 
this index when the dependent variable is ROA, but not when it is q, as shown by Table 
16.  
 
Once proved the quality of our corporate governance measure, we went on to substitute 
ROA and q for the return on equity and the return on sales as dependent variable in 
unreported regressions where the TDI estimate is still significant but only in 2000-2001. 
In Table 17 and 18 we introduce several interaction terms. The square TDI seeks to 
capture a possible non-linear effect of TDI. Although the coefficient is negative, 
suggesting a positive but decreasing effect, it is only significant, at 10%, for 2000-2001. 
The TDI-Size interaction is intended to measure whether in bigger firms, where 
management complexity may a priori create more acute agency problems, the role of 
good governance is reinforced. By the same token, good governance may be more 
valuable in older firms where founding shareholders or their relatives may exert an 
excessive, value-reducing power. Growing firms (as proxied by the growth of sales) 
may need adequate governance standards to enhance their access to financing and to 
avoid overinvestment. Finally, highly leveraged firms may, on one hand,  require a 
proper governance as a disciplining device to mitigate the incentives towards 
overinvestment and excessive risk-taking, but, on the other hand, it may have a less 
prominent effect as far as the default risk associated to fixed financial obligations may 
by itself be enough to mitigate the conflicts of interest between large and minority 
shareholders.  With the exception of a striking negative TDI-Sales growth interaction in 
the q regressions, none of these additional terms are significant for the whole period. 
The individual TDI significance is unchanged, except when interacted with age. 
 
3.3 Endogeneity checks 
 
A recurring concern with econometric studies on corporate governance and performance 
is the potential presence of endogeneity. Specifically, if there exists a casual positive 
link from performance to governance, the estimated coefficient on governance would be 
upward biased, thus rendering the previous results anything but reliable. Among other 
reasons, good performance may encourage the adoption of a better governance 
framework because: (i) Implementing governance reforms is costly, so only profitable 
companies are capable of affording the associated expenses; (ii) There may be a 
multiple equilibria problem at work, in which there is a group of low-performance/bad 
governance companies, whose insiders reap substantial private benefits of control and 
                                                 
7 The questions had to do with general opinion on corporate governance, functioning of the Board and top management, disclosure, 
and minority shareholder protection. 
struggle to perpetuate the statu quo, and a second high-performance/good governance 
group of companies that are aware of and enjoy the benefits of  good governance rules, 
and hence have the incentives to continue along this path. 
 
The use of an instrumental variable and the running of a simultaneous equation model 
are two popular devices to deal with endogeneity. An instrumental variable is one that is 
correlated with the endogenous explanatory variable but not with the dependent 
variable. Meeting such binding conditions in financial economic studies is frequently 
hard. However, we propose three possible options. The first one is a dummy with value 
1 if the company has set an Audit Committee as of May 2004, and 0 otherwise. Unlike 
other governance provisions, the creation of the Audit Committee was imposed by law 
(through the Decree 677/2001 cited in the Introduction) but the requirement, due by 
May 2004, was only compulsory for big firms. Small firms (according to a classification 
dictated by Resolution 408/1993 of the Ministry of the Economy that establishes 
maximum levels of assets, sales and employees by sector) were dispensed. In principle, 
as the Audit Committee is clearly part of a good governance framework and its creation 
was legally forced (and thus, by definition, exogenous with respect to firm 
performance), it stands out as a nice instrumental variable. Nevertheless, its use casts 
some doubt as we realize that its correlation with the TDI, yet statistically significant, is 
rather low (0.32). Moreover, 60% of the firms with below-average TDI have an Audit 
Committee, and 20% of the above-average TDI companies do not, reinforcing the 
impression that this may not be as good an instrument as we hoped for. This observation 
suggests that firms choose their own governance regimes for reasons other than this 
particular legal duty. Anyway, as can be seen in Table 19, we rerun the baseline 
regressions with this instrument in lieu of the TDI, without finding any significant 
coefficient.   
 
The second alternative instrument comes from the very field work carried out to 
construct our index of corporate governance. As mentioned in Section 2, we did a 
survey of corporate governance among all listed firms. After several reminders, we 
received no answers. At that point, we personally contacted top managers in 24 
companies we knew before this study was put in motion, and asked them to complete 
the survey. As a result of this new personal request, we managed to have the 
questionnaire completed on just ten companies. Predictably, the companies that agreed 
to respond in this instance had an average TDI (49.3) higher than that of the whole 
sample (39.1), indicating that the participation in the survey is a signal of good 
governance.8 Even more importantly, the selection of these companies was totally 
unrelated to their performance. In consequence, we are able to claim that participation 
in the survey is a legitimate (dummy) instrumental variable. The regression output in 
Table 20 for the ROA regressions, but not for q, yields a highly significant estimate for 
the whole 2000-2003 period and also for 2002-2003.  
 
Next, we postulate yet another instrument: a trading intensity variable, defined as the 
number of days the stock was traded in 2001-2003 as a proportion of total trading days 
in that period. This variable ranges from 0 to 1.9 As we should expect that companies 
with good corporate governance are more attractive to -and thus more actively traded 
by- outside investors, the positive nexus between trading and governance is evident –
actually, the correlation with TDI is 0.5. Nevertheless, trading may not be exogenous 
                                                 
8 The correlation of the TDI and the grade obtained through the questionnaire was positive and statistically significant (0.29). 
Obviously, the sample is too small to draw definite conclusions, but this positive association reinforces our confidence on the 
informative content of the TDI.  
9 Note that the median of Trading Intensity is 0.44, indicating that many stocks listed in Argentina are quite illiquid. 
with respect to accounting performance, but the correlation in this case would not be 
positive, that is, should not necessarily lead to the usual upward bias that is behind the 
endogeneity criticism. For instance, Chordia, Huh and Subrahmanyam (2003) 
investigate the determinants of stock trading in the U.S. and argue that ROA should 
actually reduce trading intensity because high ROA shares are preferred by investors 
following buy-and-hold strategies.10 Their empirical finding, after controlling for a large 
number of variables, is that ROA has no statistical effect on different measures of 
trading. Back to our estimations, the baseline regressions presented in Table 21 suggest 
that this instrumental variable enters significantly in all ROA regressions. 
 
The independence of trading and q is perhaps more questionable because investors may 
display loss aversion, leading them to hold on to past losers and to trade more actively 
past winners. In line with this behavioral approach, Odean (1999) and Chordia et 
al.(op.cit.) document that high return stocks are more traded. The expected positive 
correlation between q and trading intensity turns the latter an inappropriate instrument 
for corporate governance. Anyway, we run in the same Table 21 the baseline q 
regressions, although no significant estimates were obtained, except marginally for 
2000-2003.  
 
As a final exercise, we confront the potential endogeneity by running a two-stage least 
square simultaneous equations model, that is, treating Trading as an endogenous 
variable. To save space, we only report in Table 22 the estimates on Trading, where we 
observe significant coefficients in all cases with the exception of q in 2002-2003.  We 
also went back to our original regressions and apply this same technique for TDI in the 
same table. Again, the estimations support the claim that endogeneity does not drive our 
econometric results. 
 
3.4 Ownership and Performance 
 
Resuming the discussion in Section 1, we now report the results involving ownership 
variables displayed in Tables 23 and 24, where we show the estimated coefficients on 
TDI and the following indicators for the largest ultimate shareholder: control rights, 
cash flow rights, the control-to-cash flow rights ratio, and the nationality.12 Most 
coefficients for both ROA and q equations, and for different sample periods, turn out to 
be non significant –results do not change before changes in the set of additional 
regressors. The exception is the ratio of control to cash flow rights, which enter with the 
expected negative and significant sign in the crisis period of 2002-2003 for both 
performance measures. A plausible explanation for this finding is that the conflicts of 
interest among shareholders are accentuated at times of financial distress and economic 
slump. Furthermore, the reigning macroeconomic instability (inflation, devaluation, 
abrupt relative price changes, and the like) allows controlling shareholders to 
expropriate minority shareholders and other stakeholders more easily, as the ability to 
monitor the company and its managers is seriously undermined in a scenario where 
balance sheets and conventional analytical tools become less informative. In this sense, 
we also introduce a Default dummy, with value 1 if the company defaulted on its debt 
as a result of the 2002-2003 crisis (which was the case of 9 out of the 65  companies), 
                                                 
10 This is why we discard one additional instrument: a dummy for companies held by pension funds. Pension  funds, as minority 
shareholders, should naturally be inclined towards good governance companies, but since they mostly follow long-term, buy-and-
hold strategies, a positive relationship between this instrument and ROA is probably present. 
12 Note, by the way, that the usable sample drops from to 54 and 46 observations for ROA and q, respectively. As TDI remains 
significant after such change, these regressions provide an additional robustness check for governance. 
and 0 otherwise. The incentive to self-dealing and other forms of expropriation is 
heightened under these circumstances, so we would predict a negative sign on Default. 
However, the estimation leads to reject any noticeable effect.   
 
Interaction terms of ownership variables with TDI were included in Tables 25 and 26 to 
test whether the power of TDI as a disciplining tool has anything to do with the power 
of controlling shareholders. Two contrasting hypotheses are sensible: (a) Good 
governance is more valuable in firms with more powerful insiders, as it helps to restrict 
the abusive actions that these insiders would otherwise commit; (b) Good governance is 
less valuable in firms with more powerful insiders, as governance rules, no matter how 
good they are, are circumvented or plainly disregarded by controlling shareholders.  
Regression outcomes lend some support to hypothesis (b) in that the separation of 
control and cash flow rights attenuate, but does not neutralize whatsoever, the impact of 
TDI on both ROA and q.13 For instance, in the third column of Table 30 (ROA in 2002-
2003), the overall TDI loading goes down to 0.00048 (for a control-to-cash flow ratio of 
1.74, the average for the 22 firms whose ratio exceeds 1.02) from 0.00058 (for no 
separation). 
 
Section 4: Determinants of dividend policies 
  
4.1 Summary statistics and additional regressors 
 
We start by showing some summary measures of dividend activity, namely, the ratios of 
cash dividends to cash flow, earnings, and sales, even though we will use the first one as 
our dependent variable in the subsequent econometric work for it best reflects the 
decision to compensate shareholders out of the available firm revenues.14 From a visual 
inspection at Table 27, it can be observed that dividend ratios were more or less stable 
in 1996-2000, increased in 2001, and then shrank in 2002-2003. The change in 2001 is 
allegedly attributable to the financial crisis initiated in 2001 that induced firms to pay 
high dividends as a means of allowing shareholders to cover themselves from the 
expected devaluation and the fragility of the banking system by buying external assets. 
In turn, during 2002-2003, in the context of a marked contraction in sales and the 
balance sheet problems derived from the currency crisis, companies seem to have 
partially adjusted through dividend cuts. For comparison purposes, Faccio et al. (2001) 
show that, for 14 European and Asian countries in 1992-1996, the dividend to earnings, 
cash flow and sales ratios were 34%, 23.4% and 3.6%. For Argentina, in 1996-2003, 
these values were 31.9%, 12.9%, and 3.4%.  
 
Our empirical strategy will consist in first identified some fundamental factors 
explaining dividends for the whole period 1996-2003 to subsequently concentrated in 
the 2000-2003 subsample, including at this stage additional governance and ownership 
variables.15 According to any standard textbook corporate model, we hypothesize the  
core explanatory variables should encompass: (a) The return on assets: The higher the 
net revenues, we should expect more dividends to be disbursed; (b) Tobin’s q: The 
better the future growth opportunities, the less convenient is to pay dividends whenever 
the firm has financial constraints to access to external sources of funds; (c) Debt to 
                                                 
13 It must be noted that, due to multicolinearity, the regressions do not include the ownership variables but their interactions with 
TDI. 
14 The source of dividend data is IAMC (2002) and the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange. Garcia Zamora (2002) investigates dividend 
policies in Argentina in the 1990s. 
15 As explained in footnote 6, we are not certain that corporate and ownership characteristics in 2003-2004 are representative for the 
1990s. 
assets: Highly levered companies may prefer to pay less dividends (increasing equity 
financing) in order to contain default risk.16; (d) Logarithm of assets: Bigger firms tend 
to be more diversified and thus less risky, to have a more fluid access to credit and to 
have less investment opportunities, thus making them more willing to pay dividends.  
 
In addition, we test the effect of the following empirical counterparts of variables put 
forward by modern dividend theories: (e) The lagged dividend to cash flow ratio: from 
the empirical finding by Lintner (op.cit.) and the more recent signalling models, we 
should presume that firms attempt to maintain stable dividends, creating a persistent 
pattern over time; the host of governance and ownership variables -whose predicted 
impact was discussed in Section 1.2-, namely: (f) The quality of corporate governance 
standards, (g) The cash flow rights of the largest shareholder, (h) The control rights of 
the largest shareholder, and (i) The separation between control and cash flow rights; (j) 
The nationality of the largest shareholder: It is sometimes presumed that foreign-owned 
firms are likely to have less stringent financial constraints and to overcome more easily 
situations of financial distress. This, coupled with an alleged desire of recovering the 
investment in as short a period as possible in macroeconomic and politically unstable 
countries, may induce these firms to pay higher dividends than domestically-owned 
companies; (k) A dummy variable for ADRs (American Depositary Receipts) issuers: 
Firms cross-listing in the U.S. may be induced to mimic the dividend policies of those 
firms they compete with for funds in foreign markets.17; and (l) A default dummy, with 
value 1 if the company defaulted on its debt as a result of the 2002-2003 crisis, and 0 
otherwise. The default should have a negative effect on dividends: whether controlling 
shareholders retain their power in the post-default scenario or covenants and legal 
mechanisms are in place to protect unpaid stakeholders, dividends are likely to be cut 
down. In the first case, controlling shareholders may feel themselves even more 
encouraged to expropriate minority shareholders and creditors, while in the second case, 
dividends will be reduced so as to meet debt obligations. Along with these controls, we 
add year and sector dummies. 
 
Summary statistics on these explanatory variables are shown in Table 28. It must be 
highlighted that, while the return on assets strongly decreased since 2002, Tobin’s q 
went up, which should be associated to the bullish stock market in 2002-2003. Equally 
shocking is the increase in the leverage ratio in 2002, at the time that bank credit was 
being cut. In this case, the explanation has most likely to do with the revaluation in 
pesos of the dollar-denominated debt after the currency crisis. Tables 29 and 30 splits 
the whole sample into dividend payers and non-payers to test whether means are 
different. In line with some of the theoretical predictions, from Table 29 it is apparent 
that dividend-paying companies are larger and more profitable, and less levered, while 
Table 30 shows that they have better corporate governance –the mean difference tests 
for the other variables are inconclusive.   
4.2 Econometric results  
Table 31 presents the baseline econometric results for 1996-2003. Since the dependent 
variable (cash dividends to cash flow) is censored at zero, a pooled Tobit procedure was 
followed in the estimation. Size, leverage, q and ROA yield the expected signs at 
conventional confidence levels, both when they enter individually (except q) or jointly. 
                                                 
16 Actually, absent bankruptcy costs, firms find debt attractive as an insurance device, as it enables more risk sharing with creditors 
instead of forcing shareholders to absorb an expected negative shock entirely by themselves. 
17 ADR issuance might also be an indicator of lax financial constraints because of the positive signal of being listed in more 
regulated foreign markets. 
Time dummies are significantly negative for 2002 and 2003, and utilities appear to pay 
more dividends than other sectors. As usual, endogeneity may cloud the reliability of 
the most econometric work. In principle, this may not be a critical issue here, since, at 
least a priori, dividend payments are decided by the firm right after each fiscal year has 
ended and when balance sheet variables are known. From this timeline structure, it is 
unlikely that year t dividends could cause changes in realized variables, such as 
earnings, sales, and the like. However, the leverage ratio and Tobin’s q may be 
suspected of endogeneity under certain conditions. Concerning leverage, this may be an 
endogenous variable if firms set in advance a stable dividend target to meet and adjust 
their debt ratio accordingly. This drawback can be ruled out by noting that, if that were 
the case, an expected positive bias should be expected between debt and dividends, 
while most regressions yield a negative and significant negative sign on debt. Therefore, 
this negative effect of debt is most unlikely driven by the alleged endogeneity of debt.18. 
As for Tobin’s q, endogeneity may be present as long as investors have a preference for 
high dividends and correctly anticipate the payout to be announced after each fiscal 
year. Again, this positive bias is unlikely to be behind the negative sign encountered in 
the regressions. As can be seen in Table 32, neither debt or q lose explanatory power 
after being instrumented. Following most capital structure theories, debt is instruments 
with tangibility, assets and ROA, as well as sector dummies, while q is instrumented 
with assets, the standard deviation of ROA and sector dummies.19   
 
In Table 33 we test whether firms prefer to keep stable dividends over time, finding 
favorable evidence after including alternatively the lagged dividend-to-cash flow ratio 
and a dividend payment dummy that takes the value 1 if the company paid any cash 
dividends in the previous year, and 0 otherwise.  
 
Before introducing our indicators of corporate governance and ownership, we check in 
Table 34 the validity of our previous model for the shortened sample 2000-2003, which 
confirms the robustness of the initial specification. Afterwards, we observe that the TDI 
enters with the predicted positive sign in the regressions reported in Table 35. 
Nevertheless, it is somewhat hard to claim an independent effect from TDI owing to the 
recurring problem of multicolinearity, which renders TDI to be non significant 
whenever the whole control set is used in the estimation- the problem aggravates when 
the controls are size and ROA, a result that should come as no surprise after the 
discussion of Section 3. Focusing on the first column, where the only controls are the 
time and sector dummies, the estimate suggests a sizable effect: a 10-point increase of 
TDI brings about an increase of 0.128 in the dividend-to-cash flow ratio, implying a 
twofold increase from the 1996-2003 average (0.129). Combined with the last comment 
in this paragraph, this a priori large impact makes advisable to treat these results with 
caution. From Table 36, another striking result emerges: all TDI subindices are 
significant –solely with time and sector controls- but Shareholders, the one that should 
be most related to dividend policies. Finally, in Table 37, none of the ownership 
variable, as well as the nationality and default dummies, appear to be significantly 
correlated to dividends. 
 
                                                 
18 This of course does not mean that endogeneity should be overlooked: even without knowing the direction and magnitude of the 
bias, it should be reminded that endogeneity of any one regressor may cause other regressors to have biased estimates unless no 
correlation exists among the whole set of independent variables. 
19 Assets and ROA are excluded from this regression due to the ensuing multicolinearity. 
Conclusions 
 
 
The goal of this paper was twofold. First, we put together, for the first time, quantitative 
measures on the quality of the corporate governance and the ownership structure in 65 
non-financial listed companies in Argentina with information for 2003-2004. A wide 
array of official and private sources were used to this purpose. In a nutshell, companies 
seem to be poorly governed vis-à-vis international practices. In turn, ownership appears 
to be quite concentrated at the level of the largest ultimate shareholder, but separation of 
control and cash flow rights prevails in less than half of the companies, with pyramiding 
being the main mechanism to create such wedge. Second, we put to the test the 
predictions of recent theories linking those measures with corporate performance and 
dividend policy in 2000-2003. Concerning performance, the results point to a sizable 
and robust effect of our governance measure on both the return on assets and Tobin’s q. 
Moreover, the separation of control and cash flow rights for the largest shareholder –an 
indicator of the incentives to expropriate minority shareholders- hinders performance 
directly, and also attenuates the beneficial impact from good governance rules. When it 
comes to dividends, only our governance measure appears to exert a positive and 
marked effect on the cash dividend-to-cash flow ratio. However, the estimates prove to 
be fragile to the inclusion of some additional controls correlated to governance.  
 
Any policy recommendation emerging from this research should internalize that 
corporate governance upgrading entails the consideration of both the private and the 
public interest. Controlling shareholders will not be inclined in this direction unless the 
incremental benefits (acting as regular shareholders) outweigh the loss of their private 
benefits of control. The evidence reported here on the ROA-governance nexus should 
be hopefully taken into account by insiders. Less apparent are the benefits from higher 
q. Historically, stock issuance has been almost negligible in Argentina, so a topic for 
future research is whether stock prices and returns play any role at all in enhancing the 
access to market and bank debt.  
 
But corporate governance is, at the same time, a public policy issue in that uninformed 
minority shareholders should be legally protected against expropriation. Raising 
awareness among investors and businesses about it is a first, obvious step that should be 
taken by the authorities to stimulate a cultural change in this area. Likewise, our poor 
TDI scores suggest that disclosure requirements frequently found in other emerging and 
developed markets should be put in place. Nevertheless, legal reforms that are not 
supported to some extent by the very companies that must apply those rules may not 
come to fruition –the mixed and rather disappointing outcome from the 2001 reforms in 
Argentina is a case in point. A compulsory, full-fledged regime of strict governance 
provisions may be self-defeating as long as some companies may ultimately decide to 
delist –delisting is another cronic problem of the Argentine stock exchange that forms 
part of the future research agenda. This conclusion comes from the observation that 
implementing a proper governance frawework is costly and time-consuming, and some 
expected benefits may not easily materialize. Thus, a balance between the adequate 
protection of minority shareholders and the incentive structure of controlling 
shareholders should be attained in designing corporate governance reforms.  
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Table 2
Structure of the Transparency and Disclosure Index (TDI)
Item % of firms with 
public information 
on each item
A. Board structure and procedures
Independency criteria for directors 73.8
Years in office of present Directors 18.5
Code of Conduct for Directors 6.2
Manager and director fees 52.3
Form of manager and director fee payment (cash, stock, stock options) 12.3
Rationale of manager and director fees 30.8
Information on whether manager and director fees are performance-based 26.2
Shareholdings of managers and directors 15.4
Number and percentage of independent directors 86.2
Details on the nomination process of new directors 12.3
Report on issues by dissident directors 0.0
Composition of the different Board committees 33.8
Details on activities of the different Board committees 1.5
B. Disclosure
Bio of main company officers 13.8
Bio of Directors 20.0
Calendar of future events 3.1
English-translated corporate website 29.2
Financial indicators for the last 5 years 98.5
Strategic plan and projections for the following years 47.7
Publication of Board meeting resolutions 89.2
Publication of shareholders meeting resolutions 93.8
Details on the appointment process of new directors 10.8
Details on attendance of minority and controlling shareholders in shareholders' meetings 10.8
Reports on issues raised by dissident shareholders 30.8
Year of hiring of the external auditor 96.9
Report of the external auditor 96.9
C. Shareholders
Details of corporate ownership (principal shareholders) 56.9
Type and amount of outstanding shares 98.5
Document on internal corporate governance standards 3.1
Dividend policy in the past 5 years 20.0
Projected dividend policy for the following years 27.7
Rationale of the past and/or future dividend policy 35.4
Source: Own elaboration from public sources.
The Transparency and Disclosure Index (TDI) measures a broad set of corporate governance features for 65 listed
firms in Argentina using public information in August 2003 to May 2004. Public sources include Annual Reports, 
fillings with national and foreign regulators, internet sources, and business publications. For each feature, the 
company is given a value 1 if there is partial or total public information, and 0 otherwise. The subindex Board 
measure the structure, procedures and compensation of Board and Top Management members. The subindex 
Disclosure measures the degree to which the company informs relevant corporate facts to outside stakeholders. 
Finally, the subindex Shareholders measures the quality of information regarding the compensation to minority 
shareholders
 
 
 
 
Table 3  
 
Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
Corporate Governance Variables  
Transparency and Disclosure Index (TDI) See Table 2 
TDI-Board See Table 2 
TDI-Disclosure See Table 2 
TDI-Shareholders See Table 2 
Audit Committee Dummy This variable takes the value 1 if the 
company set an Audit Committee as of 
May 2004, and 0 otherwise.  
Trading Intensity Number of days the stock was traded in 
2001-2003 as a proportion of total trading 
days in that period. This variable ranges 
from 0 to 1. 
  
Corporate Ownership Variables  
Control rights of the main ultimate 
shareholder 
It is the weakest link, in terms of voting 
rights, of the main ultimate shareholder 
along his control chain, based on a 20% 
cutoff (see the definition of Widely Held 
below) 
Cash flow rights of the main ultimate 
shareholder 
It is the product of all voting rights of the 
main ultimate shareholder along the 
control chain. 
No one share-one vote rule dummy This variable takes the value 1 if there are 
shares having higher voting power than 
others (at any link of the control chain) of 
the main ultimate shareholder, and 0 
otherwise. 
Pyramid dummy This variable takes the value 1 if the main 
ultimate shareholder exerts its control 
through other companies along the control 
chain, and 0 otherwise. 
Cross-holding dummy  This variable takes the value 1 if the 
company owns shares in its main ultimate 
shareholder or in firms that belong to his 
control chain, and 0 otherwise. 
Domestically-owned dummy This variable takes the value 1 if the main 
ultimate shareholder is an Argentine 
individual or family, and 0 if it is a 
company located abroad. Ultimate 
ownership of such foreign companies is 
not analyzed in this paper. 
Widely held This variable takes the value 1 if there are 
no ultimate shareholder with at least 20% 
of control rights, and 0 otherwise. 
 
 
 
Other Dependent and Control Variables 
Return on Assets (ROA) Earnings before interest and taxes to total 
assets 
Return on Equity (ROE) Earnings before interest and taxes to total 
equity 
Return on Assets (ROS) Earnings before interest and taxes to sales 
Tobin’s q  It is the market value of equity plus the 
book value of liabilities to book value of 
assets 
Dividends to cash flow Cash dividends to (total earnings plus 
depreciation) 
Dividends to earnings Cash dividends to total earnings  
Dividends to sales Cash dividends to sales 
Ln(Age) Logarithm of the company’s age as of 
2003 
Ln (Assets) Logarithm of the company’s total assets 
Size dummy This variable takes the value 1 if the 
company is in the highest 20% in terms of 
average total assets in 2000-2001, and 0 
otherwise. 
Debt to assets Total debt to assets 
Sales growth Percentage sales growth 
ADR dummy This variable takes the value 1 if the 
company issued American Depositary 
Receipts before or during the period under 
analysis, and 0 otherwise. 
Industry dummy This variable takes the value 1 if the 
company belongs to the industrial sector, 
and 0 otherwise. The activity classification 
is taken from the Buenos Aires Stock 
Exchange. 
Utilities dummy This variable takes the value 1 if the 
company supplies utilities, and 0 
otherwise. The activity classification is 
taken from the Buenos Aires Stock 
Exchange. 
Primary products dummy This variable takes the value 1 if the 
company produces agricultural products, 
livestock, minerals, or other commodities, 
and 0 otherwise. The activity classification 
is taken from the Buenos Aires Stock 
Exchange. 
Services dummy This variable takes the value 1 if the 
company provides services not included in 
the other three categories, and 0 otherwise. 
The activity classification is taken from the 
Buenos Aires Stock Exchange.  
 
Table 4
Corporate Governance and Ownership: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Observ. Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Corporate Governance Variables
TDI 65 39.13 14.53 18.75 84.38
TDI-Board 65 28.40 17.41 0.00 76.92
TDI-Disclosure 65 49.35 13.79 23.08 92.31
TDI-Shareholder 65 40.26 22.03 0.00 100.00
Audit Committee Dummy 65 0.72
Trading Intensity 64 0.46 0.35 0.00 1.00
Corporate Ownership Variables
Control Rights Main Ultimate Shareholder 54 63.14 23.24 20.75 99.14
Cash Flow Rights Main Ultimate Shareholder 54 56.90 26.58 4.31 99.14
Control-to-Cash Flow Rights 54 1.30 0.74 1.00 5.43
Control-to-Cash Flow Rights >1.02 22 1.74 1.03 1.03 5.43
No One Share-One Vote Dummy 54 0.11
Pyramid Dummy 54 0.37
Cross-holding Dummy 54 0.00
Widely Held Dummy 54 0.00
Domestically-owned Dummy 54 0.46
Source: Own Elaboration based on public sources.
The table shows the mean, standard deviation, minimun and maximum values of the corporate governance and 
ownership variables, whose definitions are provided in Table 1.
Table 5
Corporate Governance and Ownership: Deciles
Decile TDI Control Rights Cash Flow Rights Control-to-Cash Flow Rights
10 25.0 25.7 20.3 1.0
20 28.1 42.6 26.0 1.0
30 31.3 51.6 42.6 1.0
40 34.4 57.6 49.0 1.0
50 34.4 62.9 60.7 1.0
60 37.5 70.2 66.1 1.0
70 41.3 78.4 75.0 1.2
80 49.4 87.9 82.1 1.3
90 65.6 93.0 92.3 1.8
99 84.4 99.1 99.1 5.4
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 
Corporate Governance and Ownership: Correlation Matrix 
Correlations statistically significant at 5% or less in bold face
TDI TDI-B CF Rights TDI-D TDI-S Control Rights Control-to-CF
TDI 1 
TDI-Board 1 0.9062 
TDI-Disclosure 0.8617 0.6441 1
TDI-Shareholder 0.7979 0.6023 10.5722
Control Rights -0.2129 1-0.1918 -0.1282 -0.2544
Cash Flow Rights -0.2008 1 -0.1855 -0.2387 0.9173-0.1303
Control-to-CF 0.2649 0.2355 -0.5602 1 0.2003 0.2624 -0.3304
  
Table 7
Performance and Control Variables: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Observ. Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
ROA 65 0.0073 0.0265 -0.0658 0.0650
Q 56 0.8882 0.3096 0.3742 2.0755
Age 59 51.2 28.4 11.0 119.0
Assets 65 1726542 4350881 1446 29000000
Debt to Assets 65 0.209 0.158 0.000 0.544
Sales Growth 65 0.355 2.101 -0.399 16.440
ADR Dummy 59 0.237
Industry Dummy 65 0.338
Utilities Dummy 65 0.277
Primary Product Dummy 65 0.215
The table shows the mean, standard deviation, minimun and maximum values of the performance 
and some control variables, whose definitions are provided in Table 2.
 
 
Table 8 
Performance and Explanatory Variables: Correlation Matrix
Correlations statiscally significant at 5% or less in bold face
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
ROA 1 1.00
Q 2 0.14 1.00
TDI 3 0.31 -0.14 1.00
CF Rights 4 -0.07 -0.01 -0.20 1.00
Control Rights 5 -0.11 -0.05 -0.21 0.92 1.00
Control-to-CF 6 -0.09 -0.07 0.26 -0.56 -0.33 1.00
Ln(Age) 7 -0.07 0.02 -0.08 0.15 0.00 -0.04 1.00
Ln(Assets) 8 0.29 -0.19 0.62 -0.11 -0.05 0.19 -0.42 1.00
Debt / Assets 9 0.01 -0.18 -0.05 0.10 0.12 -0.01 -0.07 0.14 1.00
Sales Growth 10 -0.10 -0.03 0.00 -0.19 -0.25 -0.05 0.18 -0.14 -0.18 1.00
ADR dummy 11 0.14 -0.12 0.59 -0.34 -0.17 0.47 -0.26 0.50 -0.11 -0.09 1.00
Industry 12 0.22 -0.03 -0.10 -0.10 -0.18 -0.14 0.20 -0.22 -0.06 -0.11 -0.23 1.00
Utilities 13 -0.06 -0.13 0.21 -0.06 0.06 0.05 -0.75 0.43 0.09 -0.08 0.44 -0.44 1.00
Primary Prod. 14 -0.16 0.17 -0.16 0.22 0.13 -0.19 0.34 -0.19 -0.05 0.21 -0.18 -0.37 -0.32 1.00
 
 
 
Table 9
ROA and TDI without additional controls
Dependent Variable: ROA
Reg 1 Reg 2 Reg 3
Explanatory Variables
TDI 0.0005344 0.0005029 0.0005647
(3.11)*** (3.82)*** (2.18)**
Constant -0.0147703 -0.0146024 -0.0148466
(-1.91)* (-2.32)** (-1.36)
Adjusted R^2 0.1283 0.125 0.0816
No. of observations 65 65 65
F Statistic (p-value) 9.7(0.000) 14.63(0.000) 4.77(0.032)
Period 2000-I/2003-IV 2000-I/2001-IV 2002-I/2003-IV
Notes: 
T statistics based on robust standard errors in parenthesis
* Significant at 10%
** Significant at 5%
*** Significant at 1%
ROA and TDI without additional controls. OLS results for the whole period (2000-2003) and 
two subperiods (2000-20001 and 2002-2003). ROA is an average from quarterly data for each
period. TDI (on a 0-100 scale) is the same for all periods, and is based on public corporate 
information for 2003.
 
Table 10
Q and TDI without additional controls
Dependent Variable: q
Reg 1 Reg 2 Reg 3
Explanatory Variables
TDI 0.0061043 0.0076789 0.0037968
(3.28)*** (4.12)*** (1.78)*
Constant 0.5999676 0.4675686 0.733983
(6.53)*** (5.36)*** (7.33)***
Adjusted R^2 0.0818 0.2098
No. of observations 53 53
F Statistic (p-value) 10.75(0.002) 16.95(0.000) 3.18(0.08)
Period 2000-I/2003-IV 2000-I/2001-IV 2002-I/2003-IV
Notes: 
T statistics based on robust standard errors in parenthesis
* Significant at 10%
** Significant at 5%
*** Significant at 1%
Q and TDI without additional controls. OLS results for the whole period (2000-2003) and two 
subperiods (2000-20001 and 2002-2003). Q is an average from quarterly data for each period. 
Outlier observations with q>2.5 were dropped. TDI (on a 0-100 scale) is the same for all 
periods, and is based on public corporate information for 2003.
Table 11
ROA and TDI with controls
Dependent Variable: ROA
Reg 1 Reg 2 Reg 3
Explanatory Variables
TDI 0.0005449 0.0004813 0.0006292
(2.61)** (3.13)*** (1.79)*
Ln(Age) -0.0154112 -0.0209034 -0.0072887
(-2.11)** (-2.63)** (-1.03)
Size dummy 0.0069701 0.0099801 0.0038725
(0.54) (0.327) (-0.23)
Debt to Assets -0.0008561 -0.0041904 0.0042438
(-0.06) (-0.27) (0.22)
Sales growth 4.20E-06 -2.11E-06 -0.0004995
(0.12) (-0.05) (-0.74)
ADR dummy -0.0025899 -0.0032994 -0.0009633
(-0.41) (-0.58) (-0.1)
Industry dummy 0.0015554 -0.0053865 0.008823
(0.25) (-1.04) (0.94)
Utilities dummy -0.0171923 -0.0198887 -0.0135516
(-1.21) (-1.25) (-0.95)
Primary production dummy -0.0049964 -0.0054604 -0.0069393
(-0.63) (-0.73) (-0.66)
Constant 0.048235 0.0736632 0.0110886
(1.65) (2.37) (0.35)
Adjusted R^2 0.1513 0.309 0.0551
No. of observations 62 62 59
F Statistic (p-value) 2.51(0.000) 4.35(0.000) 3.72(0.000)
Period 2000-I/2003-IV 2000-I/2001-IV 2002-I/2003-IV
Notes: 
T statistics based on robust standard errors in parenthesis
* Significant at 10%
** Significant at 5%
*** Significant at 1%
ROA and TDI with controls. OLS results for the whole period (2000-2003) and two subperiods 
(2000-20001 and 2002-2003). ROA is an average from quarterly data for each period. TDI (on
a 0-100 scale) is the same for all periods, and is based on public information for 2003. Size 
dummy is a dummy variable with value 1 for firms in the upper 20% of firms according to total
assets, and 0 otherwise. Sales growth is the average quarterly sales growth in the two years 
previous to the sample period. Industry, Utilities, and Primary Product dummies show the 
productive sector each firm belongs. The definition of the remaining variables can be found in
the text.
 
 
Table 12
Q and TDI with controls
Dependent Variable: q
Reg 1 Reg 2 Reg 3
Explanatory Variables
TDI 0.0058871 0.0054073 0.0050566
(2.27)** (2.73)*** (2.1)**
Ln(Age) 0.0329557 -0.0650277 -0.0077511
(0.33) (-1.71)* (-0.1)
Size dummy 0.2214558 0.256726 0.2455017
(2.11)** (3.28)*** (2.62)**
Debt to Assets 0.4502588 0.6344327 0.6112416
(1.72)* (3.01)*** (1.98)*
Sales growth 0.0007618 0.0001615 -0.0291134
(0.74) (0.32) (-4.36)***
ADR dummy -0.0387129 0.0035822 -0.0179075
(-0.42) (0.05) (-0.21)
Industry dummy 0.1298286 -0.0183625 0.2894743
(1.59) (-0.25) (2.78)***
Utilities dummy 0.0997021 -0.0471228 0.0802948
(0.56) (-0.53) (0.65)
Primary production dummy 0.1634207 -0.0760166 0.3223821
(1.13) (-0.9) (3.25)***
Constant 0.2775962 0.6843045 0.3910209
(0.62) (3.69)*** (1.21)
Adjusted R^2 0.0448 0.3784 0.247
No. of observations 54 53 50
F Statistic (p-value) 5.24(0.000) 25.83(0.000) 14.94(0.000)
Period 2000-I/2003-IV 2000-I/2001-IV 2002-I/2003-IV
Notes: 
T statistics based on robust standard errors in parenthesis
* Significant at 10%
** Significant at 5%
*** Significant at 1%
Q and TDI with controls. OLS results for the whole period (2000-2003) and two subperiods 
(2000-20001 and 2002-2003). Q is an average from quarterly data for each period. Outlier 
observations with q>2.5 were dropped. TDI (on a 0-100 scale) is the same for all periods, and 
is based on public information for 2003. Size dummy is a dummy variable with value 1 for 
firms in the upper 20% of firms according to total assets, and 0 otherwise. Sales growth is the 
average quarterly sales growth in the two years previous to the sample period. Industry, 
Utilities, and Primary Product dummies show the productive sector each firm belongs. The 
definition of the remaining variables can be found in the text.
 
Table  13
ROA and alternative TDI measures
Dependent Variable: ROA
2000-I/2003-IV 2000-I/2001-IV 2002-I/2003-IV
Explanatory variables
TDI-Board 0.0003798 0.0003804 0.0004233
(2.27)** (3.13)*** (1.55)
TDI-Disclosure 0.0005578 0.0003138 0.0007863
(2.38)** (1.95)* (2.14)**
TDI-Shareholders 0.0001353 0.0002087 0.0000662
(1.22) (2.11)** (0.43)
TDI-Principal component 0.005078 0.0045892 0.0057355
(2.5)** (3.03)*** (1.7)*
TDI-Median 0.0116517 0.0137146 0.0152886
(1.84)* (2.51)** (1.74)*
Notes: 
T statistics based on robust standard errors in parenthesis
* Significant at 10%
** Significant at 5%
*** Significant at 1%
Each line of the table displays, for the three sample periods, the estimated coefficient 
(and robust t statistic) on alternative TDI measures, namely, the three subindices 
defined in the text (Board, Disclosure, Shareholders) -each measured, as the TDI, on a 0
100 scale-, the principal component of these three subindices, and the median overall 
TDI. For each of the 15 OLS regressions, the controls are all the same as in the baseline
regressions with controls. Outlier observations with q larger than 2.5 were dropped.
 
Table  14
Q and different TDI measures
Dependent Variable: q
2000-I/2001-IV 2000-I/2003-IV 2002-I/2003-IV
Explanatory variables
TDI-Board 0.0040451 0.0056068 0.004756
(2.41)** (2.22)** (1.89)*
TDI-Disclosure 0.0030108 0.0042696 0.004586
(1.82)* (1.84)* (2.44)**
TDI-Shareholders 0.0034545 0.0016843 0.0005941
(2.19)** (0.84) (0.35)
TDI-Principal component 0.0536123 0.0536887 0.0449033
(2.69)*** (2.16)** (1.91)*
TDI-Median 0.1124944 0.1500073 0.1172497
(1.3) (1.33) (1.42)
Notes: 
T statistics based on robust standard errors in parenthesis
* Significant at 10%
** Significant at 5%
*** Significant at 1%
Each line of the table displays, for the three sample periods, the estimated coefficient 
statistic) on alternative TDI measures, namely, the three subindices defined in the text 
(Board, Disclosure, Shareholders) -each measured, as the TDI, on a 0-100 scale-, the 
principal component of these three subindices, and the median overall TDI. For each of the 
15 OLS regressions, the controls are all the same as in the baseline regressions with 
controls. Outlier observations with q larger than 2.5 were dropped.
 
Table 15  
  
ROA, Q, and Alternative Corporate Governance Measure - 1
Period
Explanatory variables 2000-I/2001-IV 2000-I/2003-IV 2002-I/2003-IV
Dependent Variable: ROA
Alternative CG Measure 0.0053662 0.0055044 0.0053446
(2.45)** (2.17)** (1.26)
Principal component 0.0043242 0.0054439 0.0067902
(2.73)*** (3.2)*** (2.28)**
Principal component with TDI 0.0060176 0.0064885 0.0068267
(3.28)*** (3.08)*** (1.89)*
Dependent Variable: q
Alternative CG Measure 0.0533555 0.0268823 0.0696259
(1.54) (0.61) (2.31)**
Principal component 0.0364547 0.0252562 0.0456212
(1.39) (0.81) (2.05)**
Principal component with TDI 0.062501 0.0514405 0.0689372
(2.73)*** (1.73)* (2.71)***
Notes: 
T statistics based on robust standard errors in parenthesis
* Significant at 10%
** Significant at 5%
*** Significant at 1%
Each line of the table displays, for the three sample periods, the estimated coefficient on an 
alternative corporate governance measure, consisting in an Index with range 0-3 that adds 
three dummy variables: whether the firm has a percentage of independent directors above 
the sample mean (22%), whether the firm is in the portfolio of pension funds, and whether 
the firm answer our corporate governance survey. For each of the OLS regressions, the 
controls are all the same as in the baseline regressions with controls. Outlier observations 
 
Table 16 
 
ROA, Q, and Alternative Corporate Governance Measure - 2
Period
Explanatory variables 2000-I/2001-IV 2000-I/2003-IV 2002-I/2003-IV
Dependent Variable: ROA
CG Score by Pension Funds 0.0008149 0.0013008 0.0012313
(4.62)*** (3.21)*** (1.85)*
Dependent Variable: q
CG Score by Pension Funds 0.0058265 0.004319 0.0020239
(1.57) (1.57) (0.37)
Notes: 
T statistics based on robust standard errors in parenthesis
* Significant at 10%
** Significant at 5%
*** Significant at 1%
Each line of the table displays, for the three sample periods, the estimated coefficient on an 
alternative corporate governance measure: the score given by pension funds to all firms they 
usually trade and hold. The sample consists of 26 companies. For each of the OLS 
regressions, the controls are all the same as in the baseline regressions with controls. Outlier 
observations with q larger than 2.5 were dropped.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 17 
 
ROA, TDI, and Interaction Regressors
Dependent Variable: ROA
2000-I/2003-IV 2000-I/2001-IV 2002-I/2003-IV
Explanatory Variables
TDI 0.0019735 0.0018288 0.0022953
(1.83)* (2.39)** (1.38)
TDI^2 -0.0000156 -0.0000147 -0.000018
(-1.35) (-1.76)* (-1.07)
TDI 0.0005612 0.000504 0.0006386
(2.59)** (3.09)*** (1.68)*
TDI*Size dummy -0.0001358 -0.000189 -0.0000769
(-0.17) (-0.33) (-0.07)
TDI 0.0003824 0.0000265 0.0007522
(1.07) (0.1) (1.52)
TDI*Age 2.69E-06 7.52E-06 -2.12E-06
(0.62) (1.94)* (-0.4)
TDI 0.0005546 0.0004673 0.0006774
(2.52)** (2.93)*** (1.85)*
TDI*Sales Growth -5.89E-06 8.54E-06 -0.0013834
(-0.46) (0.9) (-0.82)
TDI 0.000442 0.0004291 0.0001384
(1.39) (1.79)* (0.27)
TDI*Debt to assets 6.47E-04 3.28E-04 0.0026687
(0.40) (0.32) (0.97)
Notes: 
T statistics based on robust standard errors in parenthesis
* Significant at 10%
** Significant at 5%
*** Significant at 1%
OLS results for the whole period (2000-2003) and two subperiods (2000-20001 and 2002-
2003).ROA is an average from quarterly data for each period.  TDI (on a 0-100 scale) is the same 
for all periods, and is based on public information for 2003. For each of the OLS regressions, the 
controls are all the same as in the baseline regressions. 
 
Table 18 
 
Q, TDI, and Interaction Regressors
Dependent Variable: q
2000-I/2003-IV 2000-I/2001-IV 2002-I/2003-IV
Explanatory Variables
TDI 0.0162038 0.0080394 0.0158863
(1.2) (0.85) (1.54)
TDI^2 -0.0001113 -0.0000283 -0.0001148
(-0.89) (-0.32) (-1.23)
TDI 0.00637 0.0059362 0.0055036
(2.21)** (2.67)** (1.96)*
TDI*Size dummy -0.0038428 -0.0041979 -0.0033814
(-0.88) (-1.12) (-0.94)
TDI 0.0055717 0.0052771 0.0119218
(0.95) (1.94)* (3.32)***
TDI*Age 5.27E-06 2.21E-06 -0.0001216
(0.05) (0.06) (-3.19)***
TDI 0.0065752 0.0054413 0.0050741
(2.39)** (2.55)** (2.08)**
TDI*Sales Growth -0.0004031 -0.0000196 0.0107459
(-3.06)*** (-0.15) (0.52)
TDI 0.0061942 0.0041172 0.0029627
(1.42) (1.24) (0.82)
TDI*Debt to Assets -0.0018984 0.0079738 0.0110808
(-0.1) (0.58) (0.74)
Notes: 
T statistics based on robust standard errors in parenthesis
* Significant at 10%
** Significant at 5%
*** Significant at 1%
OLS results for the whole period (2000-2003) and two subperiods (2000-20001 and 2002-2003).Q is an 
average from quarterly data for each period (observations with q larger than 2 were dropped).  TDI (on 
a 0-100 scale) is the same for all periods, and is based on public information for 2003. For each of the 
OLS regressions, the controls are all the same as in the baseline regressions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 19 
 
ROA, Q and Instrumented TDI - 1
Period
Explanatory variables 2000-I/2001-IV 2000-I/2003-IV 2002-I/2003-IV
Dependent Variable: ROA
Audit Committee Dummy 0.0074097 0.0073925 0.0068299
(1.1) (1.27) (0.73)
Dependent Variable: q
Audit Committee Dummy 0.0914799 0.0212256 0.0721781
(0.94) (0.27) (0.79)
Notes: 
T statistics based on robust standard errors in parenthesis
* Significant at 10%
** Significant at 5%
*** Significant at 1%
OLS results with TDI instrumented by whether the company has set an Audit 
Committee by May 2004 for the whole period (2000-2003) and two subperiods 
(2000-20001 and 2002-2003). ROA is an average from quarterly data for each 
period. Q is an average from quarterly data for each period (observations with q 
larger than 2.5 were dropped).   For each of the OLS regressions, the controls are 
all the same as in the baseline regressions. 
Table 20 
 
ROA, Q and Instrumented TDI - 2
Period
Explanatory variables 2000-I/2001-IV 2000-I/2003-IV 2002-I/2003-IV
Dependent Variable: ROA
Survey Participation Dummy 0.0073902 0.0152633 0.0230707
(1.5) (2.8)*** (2.81)***
Dependent Variable: q
Survey Participation Dummy -0.0007394 0.0167805 0.0441421
(-0.01) (0.2) (0.68)
Notes: 
T statistics based on robust standard errors in parenthesis
* Significant at 10%
** Significant at 5%
*** Significant at 1%
OLS results for the whole period (2000-2003) and two subperiods (2000-20001 and 2002-
2003) with TDI instrumented by whether the company has participated in our corporate 
governance survey. ROA is an average from quarterly data for each period. Q is an 
average from quarterly data for each period (observations with q larger than 2.5 were 
dropped). For each of the OLS regressions, the controls are all the same as in the baseline 
regressions. 
 
Table 21 
 
ROA, Q and Instrumented TDI - 3
Period
Explanatory variables 2000-I/2001-IV 2000-I/2003-IV 2002-I/2003-IV
Dependent Variable: ROA
Trading intensity 0.0226526 0.0166014 0.0275019
(2.41)** (2.21)** (2.21)**
Dependent Variable: q
Trading intensity 0.1475558 0.162527 0.0539047
(1.23) (1.71)* (0.32)
Notes: 
T statistics based on robust standard errors in parenthesis
* Significant at 10%
** Significant at 5%
*** Significant at 1%
OLS results with TDI instrumented by trading intensity for the whole period (2000-2003) and two 
subperiods (2000-20001 and 2002-2003). ROA is an average from quarterly data for each period. Q is 
an average from quarterly data for each period (observations with q larger than 2.5 were dropped).   
For each of the OLS regressions, the controls are all the same as in the baseline regressions. 
Table 22 
 
ROA, Q, TDI and Trading Intensity - Simultaneous Equations
Period
ory variables 2000-I/2001-IV 2000-I/2003-IV 2002-I/2003-IV
Dependent Variable: RO
Explanat
A
Trading I
TDI
Trading I
TDI
Notes: 
ntensity 0.0329259 0.0336572 0.0362385
(2.67)*** (3.00)*** (2.21)**
0.0012004 0.0012271 0.001514
(2.47)** (2.81)*** (2.01)**
Dependent Variable: q
ntensity 0.4245126 0.2596319 0.1694634
(2.47)** (2.06)** (0.97)
0.0154811 0.0098527 0.0077623
(2.14)** (2.05)** (1.00)
T statistic
* Signific
** Signific
*** Signifi
s based on robust standard errors in parenthesis
ant at 10%
ant at 5%
cant at 1%
Two-stage,
20001 
data for
larger t
the basel
 simultaneous equations for the whole period (2000-2003) and two subperiods (2000-
and 2002-2003) for both (a) Trading Intensity and (b) TDI. ROA is an average from quarterly 
 each period. Q is an average from quarterly data for each period (observations with q 
han 2.5 were dropped). For each of the OLS regressions, the controls are all the same as in 
ine regressions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 23 
 
ROA, TDI, and ownership variables 
Each line of the table displays, for the three sample periods, the estimated coefficient (and t statistic) 
on TDI and alternative ownership measures: (a) Domestically-owned: Dummy variable with value 1 if 
the main ultimate shareholder is an Argentine family, and 0 if the main ultimate shareholder is a 
foreign company; (b) Control rights of the main ultimate shareholder on the company; (c) Cash flow 
rights of the main ultimate shareholder on the company; and (d) Control-to-Cash Flow rights of the 
main ultimate shareholder. Default is a dummy variable with value 1 if the company declared default 
in 2002, and 0 otherwise. For each of the OLS regressions, the controls are all the same as in the 
baseline regressions. 
Dependent Variable: ROA
2002-I/2003-IV 2000-I/2003-IV 2000-I/2001-IV
Explanatory variables 
TDI 0.0004598 0.000409 0.0003322
(1.24) (1.88)* (2.74)***
Domestically-owned 0.0106716 0.0115982 0.0099056
(1.24) (2.16)** (2.59)**
TDI 0.0004839 0.0004456 0.0003641
(1.33) (1.96)* (2.65)**
-0.0000503 Control rights 0.0000253 0.0000229
(-0.27) (0.22) (0.26)
TDI 0.0004899 0.0004412 0.0003569
(1.38) (1.98)* (2.63)**
-0.0000177 Cash flow rights 0.0000288 0.0000144
(-0.10) (0.26) (0.17)
TDI 0.0005157 0.0004365 0.0003528
(1.41) (1.97)* (2.55)**
Control-to-Cash flow rights -0.0073614 -0.0039524 0.0003507
(-2.27)** (-1.89)* (0.24)
TDI 0.000621 
(1.69)* 
Default -0.0040768 
(-0.32) 
Notes: 
T statistics based on robust standard errors in parenthesis
* Significant at 10% 
** Significant at 5% 
*** Significant at 1% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 24 
 
 
Q, TDI, and ownership variables 
Each line of the table displays, for the three sample periods, the estimated coefficient (and t statistic) on TDI and  
alternative ownership measures: (a) Domestically-owned: Dummy variable with value 1 if the main ultimate  
shareholder is an Argentine family, and 0 if the main ultimate shareholder is a foreign company; (b) Voting rights of 
the main ultimate shareholder on the company; (c) Cash flow rights of the main ultimate shareholder on the  
company; and (d) Control-to-Cash Flow rights of the main ultimate shareholder. Default is a dummy variable with  
value 1 if the company declared default in 2002, and 0 otherwise. For each of the OLS regressions, the controls are 
all the same as in the baseline regressions. Outlier observations with q>2.5 were dropped.
Dependent Variable: q
2002-I/2003-IV 2000-I/2003-IV 2000-I/2001-IV
Explanatory variables 
TDI 0.0053619 0.0069655 0.006129
(2.54)** (2.84)*** (3.80)***
Domestically-owned 0.0533931 -0.1360339 -0.0098623
(-0.03) (-1.09) (-0.17)
TDI 0.005555 0.0072879 0.0054797
(2.45)** (2.47)** (2.9)***
Control rights  -0.0002549 0.0016564 -0.0010065
(-0.15) (0.71) (-0.93)
TDI 0.0056454 0.0068515 0.0057205
(2.49)** (2.71)*** (3.27)***
Cash flow rights  -0.0001199 0.0014618 -0.0009766
(-0.08) (0.75) (-1.01)
TDI 0.0057941 0.0064649 0.0060841
(2.61)** (3.01)*** (3.64)***
-0.0761783 Control-to-Cash flow rights -0.0659882 -0.0039019
(-2.35)** (-1.27) (-0.12)
TDI 0.0049681 
(1.97)* 
Default -0.0483392 
(-0.34) 
Notes:  
T statistics based on robust standard errors in parenthesis
* Significant at 10% 
** Significant at 5% 
*** Significant at 1% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 25 
 
 
ROA, TDI, and Ownership: Interaction Regressors
OLS results for the whole period (2000-2003) and two subperiods (2000-20001 and 2002-2003).ROA is an average 
from quarterly data for each period.  TDI (on a 0-100 scale) is the same for all periods, and is based on public  
information for 2003. The alternative ownership measures: (a) Domestically-owned: Dummy variable with value 1 if the 
main ultimate shareholder is an Argentine family, and 0 if the main ultimate shareholder is a foreign company; (b)  
Control rights of the main ultimate shareholder on the company; (c) Cash flow rights of the main ultimate shareholder on 
the company; and (d) Control-to-Cash Flow rights of the main ultimate shareholder. For each of the OLS regressions, 
the controls are all the same as in the baseline regressions. 
Dependent Variable: ROA
2002-I/2003-IV 2000-I/2003-IV 2000-I/2001-IV
Explanatory Variables 
TDI 0.0007089 0.0005468 0.0003577
(1.80)* (2.28)** (2.34)**
-0.0001345 TDI* Control-to-Cash flow -0.000078 -0.0000318
(-2.30)** (-1.98)* (-0.12)
TDI 0.0005016 0.0003855 0.0003033
(1.2) (1.58) (1.93)*
TDI* Control Rights  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.01) (0.53) (0.8)
TDI 0.0004644 0.0003764 0.0003089
(1.09) (1.52) (1.98)*
TDI* Cash flow Rights  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.25) (0.64) (0.71)
TDI 0.0004327 0.0003309 0.0002463
(1.08) (1.42) (1.94)*
TDI*Domestically-owned 0.0001157 0.0001984 0.0002064
(0.58) (1.62) (2.33)**
Notes:  
T statistics based on robust standard errors in parenthesis
* Significant at 10% 
** Significant at 5% 
*** Significant at 1% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 26 
 
Q, TDI, and Ownership: Interaction Regressors
OLS results for the whole period (2000-2003) and two subperiods (2000-20001 and 2002-2003).Q is an average from 
quarterly data for each period, with observations with q larger than 2.5 being dropped. TDI (on a 0-100 scale) is the 
same for all periods, and is based on public information for 2003. The alternative ownership measures: (a) Domestically-
owned: Dummy variable with value 1 if the main ultimate shareholder is an Argentine family, and 0 if the main ultimate 
shareholder is a foreign company; (b) Control rights of the main ultimate shareholder on the company; (c) Cash flow 
rights of the main ultimate shareholder on the company; and (d) Control-to-Cash Flow rights of the main ultimate  
shareholder. Default is a dummy variable with value 1 if the company declared default in 2002, and 0 otherwise. For 
each of the OLS regressions, the controls are all the same as in the baseline regressions. 
Dependent Variable: q
2002-I/2003-IV 2000-I/2003-IV 2000-I/2001-IV
Explanatory Variables 
TDI 0.0077512 0.0081147 0.0062605
(3.12)*** (3.06)*** (2.92)***
-0.0013212 TDI* Control-to-Cash flow -0.0011564 -0.0001199
(-3.00)*** (-1.73)* (-0.23)
TDI 0.0057072 0.0051433 0.0066116
(1.90)* (2.19)** (4.28)***
TDI* Control Rights  0.000000 0.000031 -0.000014
(-0.03) (0.73) (-0.71)
TDI 0.0056783 0.0052544 0.0066949
(1.90)* (2.32)** (4.36)***
TDI* Control Rights  0.000000 0.000026 -0.000015
(-0.00) (0.72) (-0.85)
TDI 0.0048657 0.0081607 0.0058686
(2.37)** (2.61)** (3.43)***
TDI*Domestically-owned 0.0012361 -0.0030955 0.0003422
(0.54) (-1.01) (0.25)
Notes:  
T statistics based on robust standard errors in parenthesis
* Significant at 10% 
** Significant at 5% 
*** Significant at 1% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 27 
 
Dividend measures by year, 1996-2003
Year Dividends to cash flow Dividends to earnings Dividends to sales
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
1996 0.153 0.222 0.245 0.330 0.046 0.089
1997 0.189 0.385 0.354 0.720 0.048 0.083
1998 0.152 0.207 0.283 0.388 0.047 0.083
1999 0.126 0.206 0.702 3.351 0.037 0.069
2000 0.153 0.210 0.387 0.730 0.036 0.055
2001 0.189 0.576 0.466 1.361 0.031 0.081
2002 0.021 0.065 0.038 0.119 0.010 0.040
2003 0.050 0.152 0.074 0.221 0.014 0.044
Average 0.13 0.25 0.32 0.90 0.03 0.07
The table shows, with yearly figures for 1996-2003, the mean and standard deviation of three 
alternative dividend measures whose definitions appear in Table 1.
 
 
Table 28 
 
Balance sheet variables by year, 1996-2003
Ln(Assets) ROA Tobin's q Debt to assets
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
12.843 1.846 4.146 7.773 0.829 0.328 0.179 0.120
12.968 1.71
Year
1996
1997 6 4.636 7.027 0.911 0.307 0.181 0.126
13.169 1.794 5.608 6.271998 6 0.876 0.331 0.215 0.154
13.285 1.767 5.102 6.141999 9 0.840 0.293 0.229 0.159
13.450 1.771 4.738 5.910 0.850 0.278 0.256 0.173
13.529 1.590 4.467 6.30
2000
2001 2 0.766 0.219 0.214 0.163
13.254 1.474 2.353 6.618 0.777 0.215 0.300 0.254
13.082 1.698 2.846 7.98
2002
2003 2 0.914 0.249 0.246 0.220
Average 13.197 1.707 4.237 6.754 0.845 0.278 0.227 0.171
The table s
definitions 
hows, with yearly figures for 1996-2003, the mean and standard deviation of the balance sheet regressors whose 
appear in Table 1.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 29 
 
Mean difference tests for balance sheet variables
Mean Mean
Dividend Payers Non-Dividend Payers
Ln(Assets) 13.46298*** 12.18412
ROA 8.083471*** 1.415236
q 2.852988 1.950592
Debt to assets 0.1465031 0.2207027***
The table shows the means of the balance sheet variables used in the estimation 
and whose definitions appear in Table 1, broken down into dividend payers and non-
dividend payers. The sample covers a maximum of 613 observations over 1996-
2003. Figures accompanied with two stars [**] (with three stars [***]) imply that such 
mean value is statistically different than the mean of the other group at 5% (1%).
 
 
Table 30 
 
Mean difference tests for corporate governance and ownership
Mean Mean
Dividend Payers Non-Dividend Payers
TDI 44.08*** 37.43
TDI-Board 35.2*** 26.07
TDI-Disclosure 52.91*** 48.19
TDI-Shareholders 44.19** 38.77
Control rights 61.95 63.63
Control-to-cash flow rights 1.258 1.32
Domestically-owned 0.548 0.425
ADR 0.277 0.197
The table shows the means of the corporate governance and ownership variables used in 
the estimation and whose definitions appear in Table 1, broken down into dividend payers 
and non-dividend payers. Figures accompanied with two stars [**] (with three stars [***]) 
imply that such mean value is statistically different than the mean of the other group at 5% 
(1%).
Table 31 
 
Cash Dividends to Cash Flow: Balance Sheet Determinants
Dependent Variable: Cash dividends to cash flow
Reg 1 Reg 2 Reg 3 Reg 4 Reg 5
y Variables
) 0.139721 0.1208576
(4.12)*** (3.68)***
0.0496856 0.0459259
(4.98)*** (4.84)***
0.1179684 -0.3582527
(1.03) (-3.14)***
ssets -1.027093 -0.7139238
(-3.86)*** (-2.95)***
 1997 0.0165076 0.0258632 0.0228356 0.0461027 0.0591087
(0.14) (0.22) (0.18) (0.38) (0.51)
 1998 -0.0238291 -0.0174689 0.0073206 0.0500902 0.0086075
(-0.24) (-0.18) (0.07) (0.49) (0.09)
 1999 -0.1866945 -0.1490408 -0.1486515 -0.0844999 -0.1105616
(-1.66)* (-1.46) (-1.33) (-0.76) (-1.07)
 2000 -0.0747963 0.0010548 -0.0445119 0.0090711 0.0163188
(-0.64) (0.01) (-0.39) (0.08) (0.15)
 2001 -0.1883885 -0.0994918 -0.1483344 -0.1316112 -0.1395932
(-1.27) (-0.67) (-0.95) (-0.86) (-0.97)
 2002 -0.6337873 -0.4875134 -0.6054717 -0.5184182 -0.4765879
(-3.42)*** (-2.82)*** (-3.29)*** (-2.90)*** (-2.65)***
 2003 -0.4314337 -0.3647389 -0.4119857 -0.3473336 -0.3450367
(-2.52)** (-2.37)** (-2.34)** (-2.07)** (-2.39)**
 dummy 0.123036 0.0277682 0.1085714 0.1182131 0.0579242
(1.12) (0.28) (0.99) (1.1) (0.6)
my 0.117748 0.1151168 0.3863711 0.4217783 -0.0554682
(1.14) (1.37) (3.95)*** (4.37)*** (-0.53)
oduct dummy -0.0179269 0.015568 -0.0326666 -0.0904107 -0.0350659
(-0.14) (0.13) (-0.25) (-0.74) (-0.31)
-2.003719 -0.405674 -0.3341172 -0.0586404 -1.510991
(-3.97)*** (-2.63)*** (-1.83)* (-0.5) (-3.40)
 1996-2003 1996-2003 1996-2003 1996-2003 1996-2003
ons 355 355 355 355 355
s 65 65 65 65 65
Pooled Tobit Pooled Tobit Pooled Tobit Pooled Tobit Pooled Tobit
Explanator
Ln(Assets
ROA
q
Debt to A
Dummy
Dummy
Dummy
Dummy
Dummy
Dummy
Dummy
Industry
Utilities dum
Primary pr
Constant
Years
Observati
Companie
Method 
Wald Test (p-value) 61.14 (0.000) 83.16 (0.000) 47.04 (0.000) 64.18 (0.000) 83.77 (0.000)
Obs. left-censored at zero 221 221 221 221 221
Notes: 
T statistics based on robust standard errors in parenthesis
* Significant at 10%
** Significant at 5%
*** Significant at 1%
Pooled Tobit results for yearly data 1996-2003 and a maximum of 65 non-financial listed firms. The yearly
cash dividends are those announced once the company's fiscal year has ended, and the accounting 
variables (including the cash flow used to scale dividends) are calculated from such fiscal year's 
statements. Variable definitions can be found in Table 1.Observations with percentage ROA smaller than -
20 and higher than 20 are dropped.
 
 
 
 
Table 32 
Cash Dividends to Cash Flow and instrumented q and debt
Dependent Variable: Cash dividends to cash flow
ry Variables
) 0.1208576
(3.68)***
0.0459259
(4.84)***
-0.3582527
(-3.14)***
ssets -0.7139238
(-2.95)***
97 0.0591087
(0.51)
98 0.0086075
(0.09)
99 -0.1105616
(-1.07)
00 0.0163188
(0.15)
01 -0.1395932
(-0.97)
02 -0.4765879
(-2.65)***
03 -0.3450367
(-2.39)**
ummy 0.0579242
(0.6)
ummy -0.0554682
(-0.53)
oduct dummy -0.0350659
(-0.31)
-1.510991
(-3.40)
 1996-2003
ns 299
ies 65
od Pooled Tobit
t (p-value) 50.05 (0.000)
ensored at zero 196
Explanato
Ln(Assets
ROA
q
Debt to A
Dummy 19
Dummy 19
Dummy 19
Dummy 20
Dummy 20
Dummy 20
Dummy 20
Industry d
Utilities d
Primary pr
Constant
Years
Observatio
Compan
Meth
Wald Tes
Obs. left-c
Notes: 
T statisti
* Signific
** Signific
*** Signifi
cs based on robust standard errors in parenthesis
ant at 10%
ant at 5%
cant at 1%
Pooled T
firms. Q is
three year
(Fixed to
announced
(including
statemen
ROA sm
obit results for yearly data 1996-2003 and a maximum of 65 non-financial listed 
 instrumented with ln(Assets), the standard deviation of ROA in the previous 
s and sector dummies. Debt to assets is instrumented with ln(Assets), tangibility 
 total assets), ROA and sector dummies. The yearly cash dividends are those 
 once the company's fiscal year has ended, and the accounting variables 
 the cash flow used to scale dividends) are calculated from such fiscal year's 
ts. Variable definitions can be found in Table 1.Observations with percentage 
aller than -20 and higher than 20 are dropped.
 
 
 
 
Table 33 
 
 
Cash Dividends to Cash Flow: Balance Sheet Determinants and Lagged Dividends
Dependent Variable: Cash dividends to cash flow
Reg 1 Reg 2
Explanatory Variables
Lagged dividend-to-CF 0.3677375
(2.13)**
Dividend payment dummy 0.4540746
(3.68)***
Ln(Assets) 0.1260323 0.0813215
(3.80)*** (2.85)***
ROA 0.0433225 0.0391772
(4.43)*** (4.63)***
q -0.3310239 -0.3716614
(-2.83)*** (-3.24)***
Debt to Assets -0.5719821 -0.5242257
(-2.41)** (-2.27)**
Dummy 1997 0.0428147 0.0511503
(0.37) (0.43)
Dummy 1998 -0.038081 -0.0141108
(-0.4) (-0.15)
Dummy 1999 -0.1349394 -0.1540803
(-1.35) (-1.4)
Dummy 2000 0.0018235 0.0353736
(0.02) (0.31)
Dummy 2001 -0.1631112 -0.1736879
(-1.17) (-1.27)
Dummy 2002 -0.5978967 -0.4204837
(-3.32)*** (-2.72)***
Dummy 2003 -0.3163607 -0.1840429
(-2.05)** (-1.28)
Industry dummy 0.0582177 0.1088636
(0.62) (1.09)
Utilities dummy -0.1349289 -0.0604578
(-1.21) (-0.58)
Primary product dummy -0.0804458 -0.0361314
(-0.76) (-0.35)
Constant -1.632618 -1.242202
(-3.60)*** (-3.14)***
Years 1996-2003 1996-2003
Observations 352 355
Companies 65 65
Method Pooled Tobit Pooled Tobit
Wald Test (p-value) 90.05 (0.000) 100.65 (0.000)
Obs. left-censored at zero 220 221
Notes: 
T statistics based on robust standard errors in parenthesis
* Significant at 10%
** Significant at 5%
*** Significant at 1%
Pooled Tobit results for yearly data 1996-2003 and a maximum 65 non-financial listed 
firms. The yearly cash dividends are those announced once the company's fiscal year has
ended, and the accounting variables (including the cash flow used to scale dividends) are 
calculated from such fiscal year's statements. Variable definitions can be found in Table 1
Observations with percentage ROA smaller than -20 and higher than 20 are dropped. The
lagged dividend-to-cash flow is the level of such variable in the previous fiscal year 
(negative values are dropped). The Dividend Payment dummy takes the value 1 if the 
company paid any cash dividends in the previous year, and 0 otherwise.  
 
Table 34 
Cash Dividends to Cash Flow: Balance Sheet Determinants and Lagged Dividends, 2000-2003
*
2
5
*
6
*
7
7
3
ed bit
001)
Dependent Variable: Cash dividends to cash flow
Reg 1 Reg 2
Explanatory Variables
Lagged dividend-to-CF 0.5937983
(2.35)**
Dividend payment dummy 0.8558688
(2.88)***
Ln(Assets) 0.1930751 0.1314615
(2.51)** (1.88)*
ROA 0.0816424 0.064233
(3.17)*** (3.29)***
q -1.170026 -1.4488
(-2.64)*** (-2.87)**
Debt to Assets -1.131707 -0.818206
(-2.05)** (-1.69)*
Dummy 2001 -0.3673346 -0.496738
(-2.19)** (-2.92)**
Dummy 2002 -0.894018 -0.653161
(-2.77)*** (-2.80)**
Dummy 2003 -0.4970166 -0.225304
(-2.06)** (-1.21)
Industry dummy 0.5154685 0.4895822
(1.88)* (1.91)*
Utilities dummy -0.2480822 -0.159298
(-0.96) (-0.66)
Primary product dummy 0.1348618 0.135574
(0.53) (0.66)
Constant -2.226291 -1.497589
(-2.33)** (-1.73)*
Years 2000-2003 2000-200
Observations 171 171
Companies 62 62
Method Pooled Tobit Pool To
Wald Test (p-value) 25.34 (0.008) 30.44 (0.
Obs. left-censored at zero 125 125
Notes: 
T statistics based on robust standard errors in parenthesis
* Significant at 10%
** Significant at 5%
*** Significant at 1%
Pooled Tobit results for yearly data 1996-2003 and a maximum 65 non-financial listed firms
yearly cash dividends are those announced once the company's fiscal year has ended, and 
accounting variables (including the cash flow used to scale dividends) are calculated from s
year's statements. Variable definitions can be found in Table 1. Observations with percent
smaller than -20 and higher than 20 are dropped. The lagged dividend-to-cash flow is the le
variable in the previous fiscal year (negative values are dropped). The Dividend Payment 
takes the value 1 if the company paid any cash dividends in the previous year, and 0 other
. The 
the 
uch fiscal 
age ROA 
vel of such 
dummy 
wise.  
Table 35 
Cash Dividends to Cash Flow: TDI and Balance Sheet Determinants 
Dependent Variable: Cash dividends to cash flow
Reg 1 Reg 2 Reg 3 Reg 4 Reg 5 Reg 6 Reg 7
riables
0.0127588 0.0039001 0.0063895 0.0149198 0.0089636 0.0129927 0.0041633
(2.28)** (0.61) (1.28) (2.51)** (1.7)* (2.33)** (0.78)
0.1627004
(1.88)*
0.0690156
(3.26)***
-0.392965
(-1.22)
-1.73621
(-2.81)***
nd-to-CF 0.7371441
(2.05)**
ent dummy 1.026434
(3.19)***
-0.2116032 -0.2043868 -0.183809 -0.250894 -0.249116 -0.2507685 -0.3370484
(-1.16) (-1.1) (-1.08) (-1.39) (-1.42) (-1.43) (-2.1)**
-0.7647883 -0.7536246 -0.6860092 -0.7772802 -0.7136279 -0.9052962 -0.698561
(-2.95)*** (-2.92)*** (-2.56)** (-2.97)*** (-2.80)*** (-2.90)*** (-2.76)***
-0.4772231 -0.4793895 -0.5116594 -0.4400478 -0.5004413 -0.4372625 -0.183317
(-2.05)** (-2.09)** (-2.24)** (-1.94)* (-2.18)** (-1.77)* (-0.81)
y 0.541146 0.5440326 0.3917792 0.5797464 0.6272566 0.5081307 0.4650673
(1.74)* (1.77)* (1.49) (1.81)* (1.97)** (1.64) (1.56)
0.3550852 0.0895996 0.0774173 0.4046428 0.5186541 0.2047834 0.0988843
(1.48) (0.34) (0.38) (1.64) (2.19)** (0.85) (0.42)
t dummy 0.3529082 0.361681 0.4170981 0.3281751 0.2849596 0.2543225 0.207235
(1.13) (1.16) (1.47) (1.06) (0.98) (0.80) (0.73)
-1.14422 -2.869526 -1.072923 -0.9308687 -0.665306 -1.196013 -1.132951
(-2.32)** (-2.39)** (-2.45)** (-1.89)* (-1.53) (-2.41)** (-2.42)**
s 2000-2003 2000-2003 2000-2003 2000-2003 2000-2003 2000-2003 2000-2003
171 171 171 171 171 171 171
65 65 65 65 65 65 65
Pooled Tobit Pooled Tobit Pooled Tobit Pooled Tobit Pooled Tobit Pooled Tobit Pooled Tobit
alue) 15.2 (0.034) 15.96 (0.043) 25.69 (0.0012) 15.75 (0.046) 21.68 (0.0055) 19.02 (0.0148) 28.38 (0.004)
red at zero 125 125 125 125 125 125 125
Explanatory Va
TDI
Ln(Assets)
ROA
q
Debt to Assets
Lagged divide
Dividend paym
Dummy 2001
Dummy 2002
Dummy 2003
Industry dumm
Utilities dummy
Primary produc
Constant
Year
Observations
Companies
Method 
Wald Test (p-v
Obs. left-censo
Notes: 
T statistics bas
* Significant at 10
** Significant at
*** Significant
ed on robust standard errors in parenthesis
%
 5%
 at 1%
Pooled Tobit re
company's fisc
statements. Va
dividend-to-cas
if the company
for all periods,
sults for yearly data 1996-2003 and a maximum of 65 non-financial listed firms. The yearly cash dividends are those announced once the 
al year has ended, and the accounting variables (including the cash flow used to scale dividends) are calculated from such fiscal year's 
riable definitions can be found in Table 1. Observations with percentage ROA smaller than -20 and higher than 20 are dropped. The lagged 
h flow is the level of such variable in the previous fiscal year (negative values are dropped). The Dividend Payment dummy takes the value 1 
 paid any cash dividends in the previous year, and 0 otherwise.  The Transparency and Disclosure Index, TDI, (on a 0-100 scale) is the same 
 and is based on public corporate information for 2003
Table 36 
 
Cash Dividends to Cash Flow and TDI, 2000-2003
Dependent Variable: Cash dividends to cash flow
2000-2003 2002-2003
ory Variables
0.0127588 0.0129488
(2.28)** (1.83)*
d 0.0105979 0.0136402
(2.22)** (1.96)**
losure 0.0112709 0.006726
(2.03)** (1.16)
eholder 0.0046088 0.0032187
(1.40) (0.78)
cipal component 0.120073 0.1154215
(2.23)** (1.77)*
an 0.4375427 0.4679927
(1.73)* (1.73)*
Explanat
TDI
TDI-Boar
TDI-Disc
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TDI-Prin
TDI medi
Notes: 
T statisti
* Signific
** Signifi
*** Signif
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Each line 
2003), th
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(pooled T
of the table displays, for the two sample periods (2000-2003 y 2002-
e estimated coefficient (and robust t statistic) on alternative TDI 
es, namely, the three subindices defined in the text (Board, Disclosure, 
ders) -each measured, as the TDI, on a 0-100 scale-, the principal 
t of these three subindices, and the median overall TDI. For each 
obit) regression, the controls are time and sector dummies.
 
Table 37 
Cash Dividends to Cash Flow and TDI, 2000-2003
Dependent Variable: Cash dividends to cash flow
2000-2003 2002-2003
Explanatory Variables
Domestically-owned 0.3128624 0.0056998
(1.27) (0.03)
Control rights 0.0043601 -0.0021286
(0.96) (-0.56)
Cash flow rights 0.0029718 -0.0010807
(0.81) (-0.34)
Control-to-cash flow rights 0.0107172 0.0087633
(0.11) (0.1)
ADR 0.0570934 0.1517129
(0.32) (0.76)
Default 0.0453669
(0.14)
Notes: 
T statistics based on robust standard errors in parenthesis
* Significant at 10%
** Significant at 5%
*** Significant at 1%
Each line of the table displays, for the two sample periods (2000-2003 y 2002-
2003), the estimated coefficient (and robust t statistic) on alternative ownership 
measures: (a) Domestically-owned: Dummy variable with value 1 if the main 
ultimate shareholder is an Argentine family, and 0 if the main ultimate sharehol
is a foreign company; (b) Control rights of the main ultimate shareholder on the 
company; and (c) Control-to-Cash Flow rights of the main ultimate shareholder. 
ADR is a dummy variable with value 1 if the company issued an American 
Depositary Receipt, and 0 otherwise. Default is a dummy variable with value 1 if
the company declared default in 2002, and 0 otherwise. For each (pooled Tobit) 
regression, the controls are time and sector dummies.
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